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We consider a random matching model where heterogeneous agents choose optimally
to invest time and real resources in education. Generically, there is a steady state equilib-
rium, where some agents, but not all of them, invest. Regular steady state equilibria are
constrained ineﬃcient in a strong sense. The Hosios (1990) condition is neither necessary,
nor suﬃcient, for constrained eﬃciency. We also provide restrictions on the fundamentals
suﬃcient to guarantee that equilibria are characterized by overeducation (or undereduca-
tion), present some results on their comparative statics properties, and discuss the nature
of welfare improving policies.
1. INTRODUCTION
Investments in human capital and their welfare implications have been a cen-
tral issue in economics for quite a few years. Still, the analysis is far from settled
both empirically and theoretically. We study the welfare properties of equilibrium
investments in human capital in a frictional economy. Specifically, we consider a
two-sector version of the canonical Pissarides-Mortensen model (see, for instance,
Pissarides (2000)), with random matching and two diﬀerent markets, for qualified
and non-qualified labor. The basic structure of the economy is simple. At birth,
agents optimally choose wether or not to invest a fixed amount of time and real
resources in education to get the opportunity to enter, after graduation, the qual-
ified labor market. The two types of labor are hired by two separated group of
firms. Wages are determined by Nash bargaining, after a random match occurs.
1The paper is part of the Ph.D. dissertation at IRES, Universitè Catholique de Louvain, of
the first author. We thank for helpful comments the members of her dissertations committee
(R. Boucchekine, V. Vandenberghe, M. Belot, B. Decreuse, B. Van der Linden), and participants
at the 16th Ecole de Printemps, Aix-En-Provence 2007, E.S.P.E. 2008, and at seminars at the
Universities of Bologna, Essex, and Statale of Milan. Comments by A. Giovagnoli and P. Siconolfi
have been helpful. The usual disclaimers apply. The first author acknowledges the support of the
"Programma visiting professor" of the Università di Sassari (Italy). We acknowledge the financial
support of MIUR, PRIN 2006, and of the Fondazione Banco di Sardegna.
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Therefore, we basically embed a Roy (1951) model of investments in human capital
into a two-sector random matching model.
Several previous contributions have studied investments in human capital in
frictional labor markets, and, in particular, in random matching models. Among
many others, Laing, Palivos and Wang (1995), Acemoglu (1996), Burdett and
Smith (1996, 2002), Booth et alii (2005, 2006 and 2007). All these papers con-
sider economies with a unique labor market and where investments in human cap-
ital increase the number of eﬃciency units of labor associated with a (physical)
unit of time. Closer to our set-up are Sattinger (2003), Charlot and Decreuse
(2005, 2006), Charlot, Decreuse and Granier (2005), and Tawara (2007), which
consider economies a la Roy. Bear in mind that the two approaches to the analysis
of investments in human capital (eﬃciency units versus heterogeneity of jobs and
binary choice) emphasize diﬀerent phenomena, and may have quite diﬀerent welfare
implications, because the eﬃciency units approach rules out, by assumption, the
potentially important eﬀects of the self-selection of workers into diﬀerent labor mar-
kets. They also have significantly diﬀerent empirical implications, see, for instance,
Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2001), and Cunha and Heckman (2006).
Our model is related to the contributions mentioned above, and, mostly, to
Charlot and Decreuse (2005). In our, as in their, economy, the choice to invest
in education is binary, and human capital acquired through schooling is not fungi-
ble.2 However, we consider a class of economies with several new features. First,
workers are heterogeneous along several diﬀerent dimensions: productivity on the
job (and unemployment benefits, or home production, if out of work) as qualified
and unqualified, and probability of graduation. We do not to impose any restric-
tion on the correlations across these variables, allowing diﬀerent agents to have
comparative advantages in diﬀerent jobs, which is consistent, for instance, with
the results in Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005). Secondly, schooling has di-
rect costs and takes time. Time to educate is an important phenomenon, because,
empirically, the related costs are, by large, the most important component of the
total costs of education.3 Therefore, it is worthwhile to consider them explicitly,
as standard in the literature (see, Becker (1964), Ben-Porath (1967), and most of
the subsequent studies). In our model, total costs are endogenous, determined by
unemployment rates and wages (and by the direct costs). Third, we consider two
separate labor markets with diﬀerent productivities and (potentially) diﬀerent va-
cancy costs and matching functions, so that unemployment rates may vary across
levels of education, which is consistent with a large empirical evidence. Variations
in the unemployment rates are determined by diﬀerences in the "labor market in-
stitutions" variables and, loosely speaking, in the conditional expectation of the
productivities in the two markets. Finally, we assume that, when agents invest in
education, they fail to graduate with some positive probability.4
2At least in developed countries, this is best interpreted as a choice about attending college or
a professional school. For the US, it is maybe better to think about graduate degrees. This choice
still involves a significant share of the population. According to Snyder, Dillow, and Hoﬀman
(2009, Table 268), in 2005-06, were awarded around 1.49 milion B.A. degrees (4 years college
only) and 0.68 milion Master and First professional Degrees.
3For instance, in Western Europe, they are usually over 90% of the total costs and, in several
countries, direct costs are actually negative, according to estimates reported in de la Fuente (2004).
4This is consistent with the data: for instance, in Western Europe, the college drop-out rate
varies between 15% in Ireland and 58% in Italy (See OECD (2004)). However, one may wonder
why to introduce individual risk in a model with risk-neutral agents. Apart from descriptive
realism, this assumption simplifies the proof of the existence of steady state equilibria, and has
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Throughout the paper, we just consider steady states, and exploit the steady
state condition in the definition of several features of the economy, and of the be-
havioral functions. Section 2 describes the structure of the model. In Section 3,
we show that, under appropriate assumptions, and generically in the space of the
economies5, there are interior steady state equilibria (SSE), i.e., SSE where some,
but not all, the agents invest in education, provided that the length of schooling,
denoted T, is not "too large". Moreover, we show that interior SSE are generically
regular. All the results in this section are mainly of a technical nature, and prelim-
inary to our analysis of eﬃciency. Therefore, most of their cumbersome details are
in Appendix 7.3.
Section 4 is the core of the paper. We propose a notion of constrained eﬃciency,
WCO, based on the idea that it should not be possible to improve upon the mar-
ket allocation, in terms of expected total surplus, by simply modifying the set of
people getting educated and letting the endogenous variables adjust to their new
equilibrium values. In our class of economies, there are three possible sources of
ineﬃciency: congestion in the labour markets (as in the usual random-matching
models), irreversibility of investments leading to a possible hold-up problem (as
in Acemoglu (1996)), self-selection into separate labor markets (as in Charlot and
Decreuse (2005)). Our general set-up allows us to study the interaction of these
three phenomena. The main result is that, typically, interior SSE are not weakly
constrained eﬃcient. At a SSE, both overinvestment in education, as in Char-
lot and Decreuse (2005), or underinvestment, as in Acemoglu (1996) are possible.
Moreover, contrary to the standard results in one-sector random matching models,
the Hosios (1990) condition6 is neither necessary, nor suﬃcient, for WCO.
The aim of the paper is purely theoretical. Random matching models and Roy
models are widely used in the literature. Therefore, it is interesting to study, in a
general setting, the equilibrium outcomes of an economy presenting both features.
We adopt a set of restrictions on the parameters of the economy as weak as possi-
ble. Evidently, there is a trade oﬀ here. Some of our results are less sharp than the
ones obtainable in more parametric exercises, as the one carried out in Charlot and
Decreuse (2005). On the other hand, drastically simplifying assumptions tend to
generate models with clearly counterfactual implications.7 In Section 5, we move
on to a simplified version of our economy, and focus on the two cases of comple-
mentarity and substitutability between ability and education. We provide suﬃcient
conditions for overeducation (in the case of complementarity) and undereducation
(with substitutability). For the same two cases, we also establish the comparative
statics properties of interior SSE. These properties are diﬀerent in the two cases,
so that, in principle, one could use them to test, empirically, for overeducation vs.
undereducation. Moreover, under the restrictions which allow us to identify the
comparative statics properties of SSE and the nature of ineﬃciency, we establish
that, to improve welfare, it suﬃces to introduce small taxes (or subsidies) on the
no substantive eﬀect on our other results (in the general setting). We conjecture that they could
all be established without it.
5Our space of the economies is infinite dimensional. Therefore, as usual in the literature, a
property is generic if it holds for an open, dense set of economies.
6The condition is that, at the SSE, the absolute value of the elasticity of the matching function
is equal to the workers’ weight in the bargaining process determining their wage. In the basic,
one-sector, random matching model, this is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for constrained
eﬃciency of SSE.
7For instance, in their model, given that the production functions are linear in innate ability,
the wage premium is constant across workers.
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direct costs of education.
While our assumptions on the parameters describing the economy are weak,
the structure of the model incorporates several very strong assumptions. For in-
stance, there is no on-the-job, or while-in-school, search; even if unemployed, work-
ers cannot simultaneously search in the two diﬀerent markets; heterogeneity is just
one—sided, because firms are identical; labor supply and investments in physical
capital are perfectly inelastic;8 after schooling, if there is any, all the agents are in
the labor force, either employed or searching for a job. Evidently, relaxing some
of these assumptions could have relevant implications (see, for instance, Shimer
(2006), Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela, and Coles (2009), and Booth et alii (2005, 2006,
2007)).
Finally, and maybe most important, we consider a random matching model. In
the last decade, the directed search approach has become increasingly common in
the literature. Its key feature is that the wage setting mechanism induces agents
to internalize the congestion externalities, so that the equilibrium outcome may be
constrained eﬃcient. It is quite reasonable to think that an appropriately designed
wage profile could take care simultaneously of all the diﬀerent sources of constrained
ineﬃciency at work in our class of economies. However, in one-sector models,
the source of ineﬃciency is just related to a congestion externality which can be
characterized using the Hosios’s condition. This is not true here. Therefore, the
results obtained in one-sector models do not immediately generalize to a two-sectors
model with self-selection. The extension of the analysis to take into account these
important, additional, phenomena is an open issue, left for future research.9
2. THE MODEL
We start discussing the demographic structure of the economy. Time is con-
tinuous. There is a continuum of agents, denoted by θi, where θ ∈ Θ0 = [θc, θh]
describes the agent’s innate characteristics, while i ∈ [0, 1] is just used to index
otherwise identical agents. The Lebesgue measure of any set A ⊂ RM , for someM,
is denoted µ (A). We endow Θ0 and [0, 1] with the Lebesgue measure, normalized
so that µ(Θ0) = µ ([0, 1]) = 1, and Θ = Θ0 × [0, 1] with the product measure.
As usual, we assume that workers drop out of the economy ("die"). If agent θi
dies, he is replaced by his own clone, so that the distribution of the agents across
θ and the measure of the agents are stationary. The dynamics of the population is
deterministic at the aggregate level, but follows a stochastic process at the individ-
ual level. Let bθ (t) be the set of type θ agents alive at t and born at τ < t, and let
µ(eθ (t)) be its measure. We start imposing
Assumption 1 (A1)
1. For each agent θi, death occurs according to a Poisson process with arrival
rate γ;
2. For each t, and each θ, the rate of change of the measure of the set of agents
of type θ due to death is −γ.
8An analysis of a (static) Roy model with labor market imperfections, and elastic investments
in human and physical capital is in a companion paper (Mendolicchio, Paolini, and Pietra (2008)).
9We thank, in particular, B. Decreuse for stimulating comments and suggestions on these
issues.
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These two properties are usually jointly justified assuming (1), and that the
random variables are i.i.d.. Then, one derives (2) by what Shimer (2005, p. 1001)
refers to as "a standard abuse of the law of large numbers" (LLN in the sequel).
In Appendix 7.1, we adapt to our set-up a well-known construction which properly
justifies A1, and the analogous assumptions (A2 and A4 ) introduced later on.
The construction is based on the assumption that the realizations of the individual
random variables are correlated across i, for each θ, i.e., on the violation of the i.i.d.
assumption.
At birth, each individual is uneducated, or unskilled, denoted by a superscript
k = ne. By spending a period of fixed length T in education, and paying direct
flow costs described by a function bc (θ), he becomes educated (or "qualified", or
"skilled"), denoted by a superscript k = e, with probability α(θ). For instance,
agent θi born at t may choose to enter immediately the unskilled labor force, or to
postpone his participation to the labor market at time (t+T ). If so, he goes to school
for a period of length T . At time (t+ T ) , the random variable "success/failure in
education" realizes. If θi graduates (this realizes with probability α (θ)), he may
enter the skilled labor force. Otherwise, he enters the unskilled one. Therefore, at
each t, there are three sets of individuals: qualified workers, unqualified workers,
and students.
For each θ, the individual random variable success/failure in education realizes
at the end of schooling. This is a strong assumption (and generally inaccurate
from the descriptive viewpoint). However, as long as the probability of failure is
exogenous, our results are robust to more realistic descriptions of the phenomenon.
Assumption 2 (A2):
1. For each agent θi born at τ , the probability of graduation (at (τ + T ) , con-
ditional of having invested in education and being alive at (τ + T )) is α (θ) ;
2. For each θ, α (θ) is the fraction of the cohort born in the time interval
(τ , τ +∆) who actually graduates (conditional on their having invested in
education and being alive in the interval (τ + T, t+ T +∆)), for each ∆.
For notational convenience, we rename agents so that, at the steady state, for
each θ, agents who actually graduate have i ∈
£
0, e−γTα(θ)
¤
.10 Given that type θ
individual are identical, there is no loss of generality in this notational convention.
Productivities on the job and in home production (and/or unemployment ben-
efits) depend upon innate characteristics and the level of education. If educated
and working as such, a worker has output fe (θ) . If unemployed, he has home pro-
duction be (θ) . Otherwise, he produces fne (θ) (or bne (θ)). We assume that, after
graduation, workers cannot simultaneously search for a job in both markets. Hence,
to simplify notation (and, at a SSE, without any loss of generality, because educa-
tion is costly), educated individuals only look for a job on market e. The functions
(f, b) are time-invariant. Hence, human capital does not depreciate, and there is no
learning-by-doing. More realistic assumptions would not aﬀect the results, as long
as these additional phenomena are described by exogenous processes.
More formally, instantaneous output is given by a function fk : [θc, θh] ×
{e, ne} → R+. Home production by a function bk : [θc, θh] × {e, ne} → R+. We
10 If a set of agents indexed by [0, 1] is born at time t and invest in education, a measure e−γT
of agents is still alive at time (t+ T ) and a fraction α(θ) of them graduates.
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assume that all the relevant functions are at least C3 on some open neighborhood
(θc − ε, θh + ε), that individuals are more productive when educated (i.e., that
fe(θ) > fne(θ), and be(θ) ≥ bne(θ), for each θ), and that productivity on-the-job is
larger than home production. These are fairly natural assumptions. Moreover, we
label individuals so that fe (θ) is strictly increasing. Bear in mind that θ is merely
an ordering parameter, because no restriction (but continuous diﬀerentiability) is
imposed on the other relevant functions, and consequently, for instance, on the ex-
pected gains in productivity due to education. Hence, we are completely agnostic
regarding the existence of some intrinsic characteristic (say, "innate ability") of the
individuals inducing systematic correlations between their performances in diﬀerent
activities.11 In particular, we allow diﬀerent agents to have comparative advantages
in diﬀerent jobs, which is consistent, for instance, with the results in Cunha, Heck-
man, and Navarro (2005). We just introduce the (very mild) assumption that, for
every agent, the productivity on the job is larger when educated.
To summarize,
Assumption 3 (A3):
1. For each k, fk (θ) , bk (θ) , α (θ) ,bc(θ) ∈ C3 on (θc − ε, θh + ε) , for some ε > 0;
2. fe (θ) is strictly monotonically increasing in θ on the set (θc − ε, θh + ε) ;
3. For each k, (fk(θ) − bk(θ)) is bounded above and bounded away from 0,
1 > α (θ) > 0, and bc (θ) > 0, for each θ;
4. For each θ, fe(θ) > fne(θ) and be(θ) ≥ bne(θ).
Agents are endowed with a Von Neumann - Morgenstern utility function and
are risk-neutral.12 Hence, there is no essential loss of generality in assuming that
each agent knows his own type θ. A firm, after the match, observes the value θ of
the agent it is matched with (i.e., it observes fk (θ) and bk (θ) , the only relevant
variables from its viewpoint).
A final remark on notation: We will often take integrals of some function of θ,
say, for instance, fe (θ) , over some (for now, arbitrary) set Ω ⊂ Θ. To avoid con-
fusion, we will use the notation
R
Ω f
e (ϑ) dϑ and use, for instance,
∂
?
Ω f
e(ϑ)dϑ
∂θ |θ=θm
to denote the derivative with respect to the bound θm of (one of the) intervals of
integration (assuming that this is meaningful). Also to simplify the notation, the
same (arbitrary) function V (.) will be sometime written V (x, y), for some pair of
vectors (x, y) , sometimes V (x) or Vy(x). This simply means that the "missing"
vector y is taken as fixed. Finally, we are only interested in steady states, and we
will omit the index t, whenever possible.
11This is also because, to obtain significantly stronger conclusions, or a substantive simplification
of the argument, we would need much more than a simple restriction on the signs of the derivatives,
see Section 5.
12 In the one-sector model, too, agents maximize their discounted expected income (instead
of expected utility of income). This can be justified making appeal to market completeness.
Here, we would need market completeness with respect to the risk of failure in education, a
much less compelling assumption, because of possible moral hazard problems. On the other
hand, abstracting from them, the main results of the paper could be established for risk-averse
individuals, provided that the degree of risk aversion is suﬃciently small.
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2.1. Workers
Existence of a continuum of agents with identical θ is introduced just for tech-
nical reasons, i.e., to guarantee that there are always workers active in sector ne.
In the sequel, whenever possible, we will omit the subscript "i", and leave implicit
the "almost surely" qualification of many of our statements.
After birth (or after attending school) agents enter the labor market, search-
ing for a job. An agent, if active on labor market k, receives job oﬀers accord-
ing to a Poisson process with arrival rate πk, endogenously given by a (possibly,
k−dependent) matching function. Let π ≡ (πne, πe). Let r0 be the (type- and
education-invariant) interest rate, and wk(θ, π) be the wage rate of a type θ agent,
if k. Let (γ + r0) ≡ r.
Define as Uk(θ, π) the expected life-time utility of search of an agent of type θ
and education k, as V k(θ, π) = w
k(θ,π)
r his expected life-time utility of a match. As
usual, Uk(θ, π) = π
kwk(θ)+rbk(θ)
r(r+πk) .
Assume that capital markets are perfect and, without any essential loss of gen-
erality, let bc (θ) be time-invariant. At birth, the discounted, expected utility of an
agent of type θ investing in education is
H(θ, π;T ) = e−rT [α(θ)Ue(θ, π) + (1− α(θ))Une(θ, π)]−
¡
1− e−rT
¢
r
bc (θ) ,
i.e., if an agent chooses to invest in education, he bears the direct costs up to period
T . Then, if he graduates (which happens with probability α(θ)), he enters the labor
market for educated workers. Otherwise (with probability (1− α(θ)) , he enters the
other market.
Evidently, an agent invests in education only if H(θ, π;T ) ≥ Une(θ, π). Solving
H(θ, π;T )− Une(θ, π) = 0, and using continuity of the maps, we can partition Θ0
into two (measurable) subsets of types of agents: the ones investing in education
and the others. For the sake of concreteness, let’s assume that all the indiﬀerent
agents choose to invest. Hence, by our tie-breaking rule, rearranging variables, and
multiplying by erT , an agent of type θ chooses to get educated if and only if
G (θ, π;T ) ≡ α(θ) (Ue(θ, π)− Une(θ, π)) +
¡
1− erT
¢
(c (θ) + Une(θ, π)) ≥ 0, (1)
where c (θ) ≡ ?c(θ)r . The function e−rTG(θ, π;T ) is the discounted, expected value
of the investment in education.
Assuming stationarity, define Θ0k(θ, π;T ), for k = e, ne, the set of types invest-
ing (if k = e) or not investing (if k = ne) in education. The two sets are implicitly
defined by the conditions G(θ, π;T ) ≥ 0 and G(θ, π;T ) < 0, respectively. Using
A1-A2, define the correspondences describing (modulo a relabelling of the agents)
the stationary labor force:
a. Θeα (π;T ) =
©
θi ∈ Θ|G(.) ≥ 0 and i ≤ e−γTα (θ)
ª
, the set of educated
workers,
b. Θneα (π;T ) =
©
θi ∈ Θ|G(.) < 0 or G(.) ≥ 0 and e−γT ≥ i > e−γTα (θ)
ª
,
the set of uneducated workers.
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Evidently,
µ (Θeα (π;T )) = e−γT
Z
Θ0e(π;T )
α (ϑ) dϑ
and (2)
µ (Θneα (π;T )) =
Z
Θ0ne(π;T )
dϑ+ e−γT
Z
Θ0e(π;T )
(1− α (ϑ)) dϑ
= µ
¡
Θ0ne (.)
¢
+ e−γT
¡
µ
¡
Θ0e (.)
¢
− µ (Θeα (.))
¢
.
By continuity of G (θ, π;T ) , Θ0e (π;T ) is the union of a finite collection of closed
intervals and (possibly) of isolated points, at any (π, T ).
2.2. Firms
Each firm is endowed with a technology allowing it to use one unit of labor to
produce a quantity of output. Given that, at any SSE, expected profits are nil, to
restrict firms to be active only in one market does not entail any loss of generality.
Firms (potentially) active in each sector are identical, and there is an unlimited
number of potential entrants in each industry. We can think of the two sectors as
defined by diﬀerent technologies used to produce the same good, or (more plausibly)
as sectors producing diﬀerent commodities. Without any loss of generality, both
output prices are equal to 1, so that we can ignore them.
The set-up of the demand side of each one of the two labor markets is standard.
Under perfect capital markets, firms have the same discount factor r0. To open a
vacancy in labor market k entails a fixed, flow cost, vk, for k = ne, e, satisfying
v ≡ (vne, ve) >> 0. Usually, they are interpreted as advertising and recruitment
costs. Also, remember that γ is the arrival rate of the Poisson process describing
the dissolution of a match and that (γ + r0) ≡ r. Finally, for each firm active in
market k, matches are governed by a Poisson process with arrival rate qk.
The flow of profits induced by a vacancy filled by a θ worker is
¡
fk(θ)− wk (θ)
¢
,
until he drops out of the match. Hence, its expected, discounted value (conditional
on Θkα (π;T )) is
Jk =
R
Θkα(π;T )
¡
fk (ϑ)− wk (ϑ, π)
¢
dϑ
rµ (Θkα (π;T ))
. (3)
Vacancies in a market are created as long as their expected value is positive.
Hence, assuming perfect competition, the zero expected profit condition requiresR
Θkα(π;T )
¡
fk (ϑ)− wk (ϑ, π)
¢
dϑ
rµ (Θkα (π;T ))
=
vk
qk
. (4)
2.3. Bargaining
After each match, the shares of output of worker and firm are determined by
a bargaining process, taking place after the type of the worker is revealed (equiv-
alently, the wage is output - i.e., worker’s type - contingent). The firm and the
worker bargain over their shares of total output adopting the Nash bargaining so-
lution criterion, with exogenous weights respectively (1− β) and β. The outside
options are, respectively, Uk(θ, π), for a worker of type θ and qualification k, and 0
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for each firm, by the free-entry assumption. Hence, each firm always hires the first
worker it meets. The output shares are obtained solving
max
µ
wk (θ, π)− rUk(θ, π)
r
¶β µ
fk (θ)− wk (θ, π)
r
¶1−β
,
and, as usual, the wage of a θ−worker active in sector k is
wk (θ, π) = β
¡
r + πk
¢
fk (θ)
r + βπk
+ (1− β) rb
k (θ)
r + βπk
. (5)
2.4. Matching and unemployment
At a steady state, on market k, the measure of unemployed agents is ukµ(Θkα (π;T )),
while okµ(Θkα (π;T )) is the measure of vacant jobs ("openings"), expressed in terms
of the measure of the labor force of type k. Define the "market tightness" variable
φk ≡ okuk , for each k. Let
qk = qk(φ) ≡ mk( 1
φk
, 1) and πk = πk (φ) ≡ φkqk(φ) ≡ m(1, φk),
be, for each k, the functions associating with each φk the arrival rate of the Poisson
process governing the flows of job applications and job oﬀers in sector k. As usual,
we adopt
Assumption 4 (A4):
1. mk(uk, ok) ∈ C3 satisfies ∇mk >> 0, is concave, homogeneous of degree 1 in
(uk, ok) and satisfies the Inada’s condition;
2. qk(φ) ∈ C3 satisfies ∂q
k
∂φk
< 0, and ∂q
k
∂φk0
= 0. Moreover, ηqk(φ) ≡ φ
k
qk(φ)
∂qk
∂φk
∈
(−1, 0) ;
3. πk (φ) ∈ C3 satisfies ∂πk
∂φk
> 0 and ∂π
k
∂φk0
= 0. Moreover, ηπk(φ) ≡ φ
k
πk(φ)
∂πk
∂φk
=
(1 + ηqk(φ)) ∈ (0, 1) .13
Let bθkα (t) define the set of agents of type θ, alive at t, and active in labor
market k. As in A1, we introduce the following:
Assumption 5 (A5):
1. For each θ and each i ∈ bθkα (t) , if unemployed, job oﬀers follow a Poisson
process with arrival rate πk (φ) ;
2. At each t, bθkα (t) and k, πk (φ) is the rate of change, due to the transition into
employment, of the measure of unemployed agents.
13Evidently, πk (φ)
?
and qk(φ)
?
only depends upon φk, for each k. We write them this way to
simplify notation.
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The size of the set of unemployed is aﬀected by the flows of individuals dropping
out of the labor force, at rate γ, or getting a job, at rate πk(φ). The flow of
individuals into unemployment is due to the new workers replacing the ones leaving
the market. For the educated workers, at each t, it is given by the inflow of people
who, at (t− T ) , had chosen to get into education, and have both survived and
succeeded, and has rate γµ (Θeα (.)) . Therefore, at a stationary state,
∂ueµ (Θeα (π;T ))
∂t
= (−γue − πe (φ)ue + γ)µ (Θeα(π;T )) .
Using (2) , the stationary rate of unemployment for the educated agents is
ue∗ =
γ
γ + πe (φ)
. (6)
Similarly, one can show that
une∗ =
γ
γ + πne (φ)
. (7)
Evidently, these are the obvious translations in our setting of the usual stationary
values of the rate of unemployment.
2.5. The space of the economies
In the sequel, several results are established for a proper subset of economies.
The parameters defining the economy are: vacancy costs, v ∈ R2++, a pair (me,mne)
satisfying A4, and a vector (f, b, c, α) satisfying A3. We always treat (γ, r0), hence
r, as fixed. For convenience, we define the space of the economies directly in terms
of c(θ) = rbc(θ). Thus, an economy is
ξ = (v,m, f, b, c, α) ∈ Ξ.
We endow R2++ with the Euclidean topology, all the functional spaces with the C3
compact-open topology, and Ξ with the product topology. It is well known that Ξ
is a metric space.
A property is generic if it holds for an open and dense subset of parameters.
This is the standard notion of genericity for infinite dimensional spaces, given that
there is no canonical notion of measure.
3. EQUILIBRIUM
Here, and in the sequel, we describe all the functions as depending upon φ,
instead of π or q. Also, whenever required, we make explicit their dependence on
(T, ξ) .
At a steady state, replacing (5) into (1), we obtain
G (θ, φ;T, ξ) = α (θ)
∙
πe (φ)βfe (θ) + rbe (θ)
r + βπe (φ)
− π
ne (φ)βfne (θ) + rbne (θ)
r + βπne (φ)
¸
+
¡
1− erT
¢ ∙
c (θ) +
πne (φ)βfne (θ) + rbne (θ)
r + βπne (φ)
¸
. (8)
We define SSE in terms of the pair of "market tightness" variables φ = (φe, φne) .
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Definition 1. Given (T, ξ) , an interior SSE is a pair (φ
e
, φ
ne
), and associated
(we(θ, φ;T, ξ), wne(θ, φ;T, ξ)) and (Θeα(φ;T, ξ),Θneα(φ;T, ξ)), such that:
i.
?
Θkα(φ)(f
k(ϑ)−wk(ϑ,φ;T,ξ))dϑ
rµ(Θkα(φ))
= v
k
qk(φ)
, for each k,
ii. wk
¡
θ, φ;T, ξ
¢
= β (r+π
k(φ))fk(θ)
r+βπk(φ)
+ (1− β) rb
k(θ)
r+βπk(φ)
, for each k,
iii. Θ0e(φ;T, ξ) 6= ∅ and Θ0e(φ;T, ξ) 6= Θ0.
Conditions (i− ii) are standard, (iii) is the interiority condition.
Given that α (θ) ∈ (0, 1) , for each θ, the set Θneα (φ;T, ξ) is always non-empty.
On the contrary, it may very well be that Θ0e (φ;T, ξ) = ∅ and, for T suﬃciently
large, the only SSE has this property. Anyhow, we will ignore these trivial equilib-
ria.14
Replacing (ii) into (i) , we can rewrite the zero-profit conditions as
Φk
0
(φ;T, ξ) ≡ 1− β
r + βπk(φk)
R
Θkα(φ;T,ξ)(f
k (ϑ)− bk(ϑ))dϑ
µ(Θkα (φ;T, ξ))
− v
k
qk(φ)
= 0, for each k.
(9)
Let Φ0(φ;T, ξ) ≡ (Φne0(φ;T, ξ),Φe0(φ;T, ξ)). Then, by definition, φ is an interior
SSE if and only if Φ0(φ;T, ξ) = 0, Θ0e(φ;T, ξ) 6= Θ0, and Θ0ne(φ;T, ξ) 6= ∅.
It is convenient to replace Φ0 (φ;T, ξ) with
Φ (φ;T, ξ) ≡
"
r+βπe(φ)
1−β Φ
e0 (φ;T, ξ)
r+βπne(φ)
1−β Φ
ne0 (φ;T, ξ)
#
≡
∙
F e (φ;T, ξ)−Ae (φe;T, ξ)
Fne (φ;T, ξ)−Ane (φne;T, ξ)
¸
≡
⎡
⎣
?
Θeα(φ;T,ξ)(f
e(ϑ)−be(ϑ))dϑ
µ(Θeα(φ;T,ξ)) − ve
r+βπe(φe)
(1−β)qe(φe)?
Θneα(φ;T,ξ)(f
ne(ϑ)−bne(ϑ))dϑ
µ(Θneα(φ;T,ξ)) − vne
r+βπne(φne)
(1−β)qne(φne)
⎤
⎦ .
Clearly, Φ0(φ;T, ξ) = 0 if and only if Φ(φ;T, ξ) = 0. Evidently, for each k,
F k (φ;T, ξ) depends upon φ only because of the eﬀects of its changes on the set
Θkα (φ;T, ξ) , while, for each k, Ak(φ;T, ξ) does not depend upon Θkα (φ;T, ξ) .
This is very convenient in computations and therefore, in the sequel, we will mostly
use this map.
There are two main diﬃculties in establishing the existence of interior SSE. First,
for T large, there is always a trivial SSE where no one invests in education. Under
very general (and natural) assumptions, for T suﬃciently small, there is a SSE
where all the agents invest in education. Therefore, the best we can look for is the
existence of an interval (Tξ, T ξ) such that, for each T ∈ (Tξ, T ξ), the economy ξ has
an interior SSE. Secondly, we can use a fixed point argument to show the existence
of SSE (once we impose some restrictions on the agents’ expectations concerning
the inactive sector, if any). However, fixed point arguments do not seem to suﬃce
to establish the existence of interior SSE. Hence, we need a diﬀerent approach.
The proof is cumbersome and we postpone all the technicalities to Appendix 7.3.
For it to work, we need an additional property, namely, that, at the unique SSE
associated with the artificial economy where all the agents invest in education, if
there are no costs of education, each agent would actually choose to invest. This is
a very mild restriction, indeed. By continuity, we can formulate it as follows.
14Trivial "autarkic" equilibria with no vacancies and no labor force in one sector (or in both)
also exist, as usual in random matching models. The diﬀerence is that, in our economy, for T
suﬃciently large, at each SSE, Θ0e (φ;T, ξ) = ∅.
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Assumption 6 (A6):
Let φξ be the (unique) SSE of the artificial economy ξ ∈ Ξ with Θ0e = Θ0.
There is Tξ such that G(θ, φξ;T, ξ) ≥ 0, for each θ ∈ Θ0, if and only if T ∈ (0, Tξ].
Lemma A1 in Appendix 7.3.1 provides one set of restrictions on ξ such that A6
holds. However, A6 holds also under several other sets of assumptions and, most
important, it is very natural in our set-up.
Theorem 1. Under A1-A6, for each ξ ∈ Ξ∗, an open, dense subset of Ξ, there
is an interior SSE φ(T, ξ) ∈ C1 for each T ∈ (Tξ, T ξ), an open subset of (0,∞) .
Proof. See Appendix 7.3.1.
The key point is that, modulo some arbitrarily small adjustment of production
and education cost functions, and of vacancy costs, there is an interval (Tξ, T ξ) for
which interior SSE exist. As already explained, this is the best result we can hope
for, from the qualitative viewpoint.
Remark 1. The proof of Thm. 1 exploits appropriate perturbations of v, which
are, possibly, k−dependent. They could be replaced by perturbations of fk(θ) =,
for each k, and by local perturbations of the functions qk(φ) (preserving, if so
required, its invariance across markets).
Define the set
ΞT = {ξ ∈ Ξ| given T , there is an interior SSE, φ(T, ξ)} .
Next, we study some properties of ΞT , for arbitrarily given T > 0. The results may
be of some autonomous interest, but they are mainly motivated as a step to discuss
(lack of) eﬃciency of SSE.
Theorem 2. For each T > 0, the set ΞT is non-empty and it contains an open
set Ξ
◦
T . Moreover, Ξ
◦
T contains an open, dense subset Ξ
reg
T such that, for each
ξ ∈ ΞregT , at each interior SSE φ(T, ξ),
i. G(θc, φ(ξ); ξ) 6= 0 and G(θh, φ(ξ); ξ) 6= 0,
ii. DφΦ(φ; ξ) has full rank at φ = φ(ξ),
iii. the number of interior SSE is finite, and there is an open neighborhood
V (ξ) ⊂ ΞregT such that, at each ξ ∈ V (ξ), interior SSE are locally described by a
finite collection of C1 maps, (φ1 (ξ) , ..., φN (ξ)) , for some N.
(i, ii) are established in Appendix 7.3.2. (iii) follows immediately from them
and the implicit function theorem (IFT in the sequel).
As usual, we call regular an interior SSE such that DφΦ(φ; ξ) has full rank
(implicitly, this requires that (i) above holds, otherwise, Φ(φ; ξ) may be non dif-
ferentiable). If each interior SSE of an economy is regular, we call the economy
regular.
4. EFFICIENCY PROPERTIES OF INTERIOR SSE ALLOCATIONS
We start with an informal discussion. As common in the literature, we de-
fine eﬃciency in terms of steady state total, discounted, expected surplus. More
problematic is to select the appropriate set of policy instruments. An intuitively
appealing notion of constrained optimality (CO) requires that the SSE allocation
cannot be improved upon just by changing the set of people getting educated and
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the "market tightness" variables φ (i.e., unemployment and vacancies). Unfortu-
nately, such a notion would be useless in our context and for our purposes. An SSE
allocation, to be CO, must be an optimal solution to the planner’s problem, given
the specific selection of the set Θ0e. In the canonical one-sector, random matching
model, SSE are typically constrained ineﬃcient, unless the "market power" weight
β happens to satisfy the Hosios (1990) condition: β = |ηqk(φ)|, where ηqk(φ) is the
elasticity of qk(φ) with respect to φk. Given Θ0e, our model reduces to a pair of
disjoint random matching economies. Therefore, a necessary condition for a SSE
to be CO is β =|ηqk(φ)|, for each k. Hence, SSE allocations typically are not CO,
as long as β is an exogenous parameter. This obscures the nature of ineﬃcien-
cies specifically related to the educational choices of the agents, if any. To avoid
this problem, we propose a diﬀerent eﬃciency concept, Weak Constrained Opti-
mality (WCO). With our definition, the planner can choose any measurable subset
Θ0e. This choice induces a pair φ, obtained as SSE of the two (now, separated)
sub-economies e and ne.15 In a one-sector model, interior SSE are trivially WCO,
because they are globally unique and the constraint set of the planner reduces to
a single point, the SSE itself. Hence, the notion of WCO is extremely weak, and,
consequently, WCO allocations do not have a strong appeal from the normative
viewpoint. This criterion, however, is useful. First, it allows us to pinpoint sources
of ineﬃciency just related to the two-sector structure of the economy, and to the
private nature of the investments in education. Secondly, the weaker the notion of
CO, the stronger the ineﬃciency result.
We restrict the analysis to steady states, and assume r0 = 0, so that r = γ (or,
rather, we consider the limit case for r0 converging to zero). This entails a loss of
generality, but it allows us to sidestep issues related to dynamic optimality versus
optimality of the steady states, and it is standard in this literature.
In the sequel, the length of schooling, T , is fixed, hence omitted from notation.
The planner’s objective function, P 0(u, o,Θ0e; ξ), is the steady state, discounted,
expected total surplus, net of vacancy costs and of the direct costs of education. Its
explicit form is given by (12), in Appendix 7.4. The planner’s policy instruments
are the choice of a measurable subset of Θ0e and of the pair (u, o) . The planner
faces three constraints:
a. ue = γγ+πe(φ) ;
b. une = γγ+πne(φ) ;
c. ΦΘ0e(φ; ξ) = 0.
The last constraint diﬀers from the equilibrium condition Φ (φ; ξ) = 0. In
Φ
Θ0e
(φ; ξ) , Θ0e is selected by the planner, while, in Φ (φ; ξ) , it is implicitly given
by the additional condition G (θ, φ; ξ) ≥ 0, for each θ ∈ Θ0e. Given the constraints
(a−b), the policy instruments actually reduce to Θ0e and φ. Also, we are implicitly
imposing symmetry in the treatment of agents of the same type θ, because it always
holds, at a WCO allocation.
For completeness, we reformulate in our set-up the standard notion of CO and
the ineﬃciency result already mentioned.
15Our notion of WCO is somewhat related to the one commonly used in the literature on general
equilibrium with incomplete markets (see, Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986)). In both cases,
the planner chooses the investment portfolios, taking into account the induced adjustment of the
endogenous equilibrium variables (prices there, φ here). We are completely agnostic about the
(far from trivial) problem of the existence of WCO allocations, that is not really germane to the
issue under consideration.
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Define as P (φ,Θ0e; ξ) the objective function obtained replacing into P 0(u, o,Θ0e; ξ)
the stationary values of (u, o) , given by (a− b) above and by ok = φkuk, for each
k.
Definition 2. A pair (φ,Θ
0e
) is Constrained Optimal (CO) if and only if it is
solution to the problem
choose (φ,Θ0e) ∈ argmaxP (φ,Θ0e; ξ).
Proposition 1. Under A1-A6, there is an open, dense subset Ξ
0 ⊂ ΞregT such
that, for each ξ ∈ Ξ0, each interior SSE is not CO.
The proof of Prop. 1 is straightforward (given Theorem 2 above) and, therefore,
omitted.
We obtain the notion of WCO by introducing into the planner’s optimization
problem the additional constraint (c), defined above.
Definition 3. A pair (φ, Θ
0e
) is Weakly Constrained Optimal (WCO) if and
only if it is a solution to the problem
choose (φ,Θ0e) ∈ argmaxP (φ,Θ0e; ξ) subject to ΦΘ0e (φ; ξ) = 0.
In Appendix 7.4 we establish our key result.
Theorem 3. Under A1-A6, there is an open, dense subset of economies, Ξ ⊂
ΞregT , such that, for each ξ ∈ Ξ, each interior SSE is not WCO.
Remark 2. Throughout the paper, β is an exogenous parameters. As we will
see later on, the value of (β + ηqk(φ)) plays a role in determining the lack of WCO
of SSE and, most important, the nature of the ineﬃciency. However, the Hosios0
condition is neither necessary, nor suﬃcient, to guarantee WCO.
Remark 3. Thm. 3 holds generically in the set of regular economies with in-
terior SSE. We have formally established existence of a (possibly) small subset of
economies with these properties. However, this last theorem does not rest in any
substantive sense on Thm. 1. Its result holds generically in the set of regular
economies with interior SSE. Moreover, its proof rests heavily on diﬀerentiability.
This property is never at issue here. In the planner’s problem what matters are
the derivatives ∂φ
k
∂θm
, for k = e, ne, obtained by the IFT applied to the constraint
ΦΘ0e (φ; ξ) = 0, at the values θm selected by the planner. While it is possible that
rank DφΦ (φ; ξ) < 2, rankDφΦΘ0e (φ; ξ) = 2, always. Therefore,
∂φk
∂θ |θ=θm , for
k = e, ne, are always well-defined, here.
The literature has identified three diﬀerent possible sources of constrained in-
eﬃciency. First, when (β + ηqk(φ)) 6= 0 at the SSE, the equilibrium is constrained
ineﬃcient, because agents do not internalize the congestion externality. Secondly,
with investments in human capital, there may be an "hold up" eﬀect, stressed by
Acemoglu (1996) in a diﬀerent, but related model: educated workers do not receive
the full return on their investment, because of the wage setting mechanism, and of
the irreversibility of their investment. In his model, this always induces underin-
vestment in education.16 Finally, when a subset of workers switches from one sector
16Acemoglu’s economy is always characterized by full employment, so that there are no conges-
tion externalities at play. Constrained ineﬃciency is due to lack of contractibility of investments
and the hold-up problem. His results are relevant in our set-up, because a somewhat similar
"hold-up" eﬀect is at play here.
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to the other, the expected productivities in both sectors may vary, and with them
the creation of vacancies. This is an additional potential source of ineﬃciency and,
following Charlot and Decreuse (2005), we call it composition eﬀect.17
Our notion of WCO neutralizes sector-by-sector congestion externalities. The
other two kinds of sources of ineﬃciency are potentially active.
Let’s make precise our notions of over and undereducation. As in the proof of
Thm. 3, and without any loss of generality, we restrict the planner to choose sets
Θ0e given by the union of a finite collection of intervals [θm, θm+1] . Replace into its
objective function the pair of C1 functions φk (θ1, ..., θm) , k = ne, e, obtained ap-
plying the IFT to the constraint ΦΘ0e (φ; ξ) = 0. As mentioned in Remark 3 above,
this pair of functions always exists. Then, the modified planner’s optimization
problem is
max
[θ1,...,θm,...,θM ]
P (θ1, ..., θM ; ξ) ≡ P (φe (.) , φne (.) , (θ1, ..., θM ); ξ) . (10)
Define χ (θ) = 1, if θm ∈ [θm, θm+1] ⊂ Θ0e, χ (θ) = 2, if θm ∈ [θm−1, θm] ⊂ Θ0e.
Definition 4. A SSE of the economy ξ ∈ Ξ exhibits (local) undereducation
(overeducation) at θm ∈ G−1φ (0) if and only if (−1)
χ(θm) ∂P
∂θm
> 0 (if and only if
(−1)χ(θm) ∂P∂θm < 0).
This formulation will become handy in the sequel and the basic idea is really
straightforward. There is overeducation if (locally) we increase the total surplus
by shrinking the set of agents investing in education. If θm is the lower bound of
an interval [θm, θm+1] ⊂ Θ0e, this requires ∂P∂θm > 0. If θm is an upper bound, it
requires ∂P∂θm < 0, i.e., it requires (−1)
χ(θm) ∂P
∂θm
< 0.
The (necessary) first order conditions of the modified planner’s optimization
problem (10) are
∂P
∂θm
=
∂P
∂θm
+
µ
∂P
∂φe
∂φe
∂θm
+
∂P
∂φne
∂φne
∂θm
¶
= 0, for each θm.
Thus, ∂P∂θm is the sum of two terms, capturing the direct and indirect eﬀects of
changes in θm on the objective function. As in Appendix 7.4, define the map
T (ρ, θ, φ; ξ) = α (θ)
ρπe (φ) fe (θ) + γbe (θ)
γ + ρπe (φ)
+
¡
1− eγT
¢
c (θ)
+
¡
1− eγT − α (θ)
¢ ρπne(φne)fne (θ) + γbne (θ)
γ + ρπne (φ)
,
where, at ρ = β, T (β, θ, φ; ξ) = G (θ, φ; ξ) , while, at ρ = 1, T (1, θ, φ; ξ) is the social
gain (net of the total cost of education) of the investment in education of agent θ,
i.e., the relevant variable from the planner’s viewpoint.
Evidently, if an interior SSE is WCO, it must satisfy the necessary first order
conditions of optimization problem (10). Then, to understand the nature of the
ineﬃciency, it suﬃces to study the sign of ∂P∂θm at each θm ∈ G
−1
φ (0), evaluated at
17 In their model, it always induces overinvestment in education, because of the eﬃciency crite-
rion that they adopt.
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an interior SSE. By direct computation, using the expressions for P (θ1, ..., θM ; ξ)
which is obtained from eq. (12) (in Appendix 7.4), at each interior SSE,
(−1)χ(θm) eγT ∂P
∂θm
= T (1, θm, φ; ξ)−
Ã
α (θm) γveφ
e
γ + πe (φ)
+
¡
1− eγT − α (θm)
¢
γvneφne
γ + πne (φ)
!
.
The first term, T (1, θm, φ; ξ) , is related to the "hold up" problem stressed in Ace-
moglu (1996), because, when β = 1, the value of T (1, θm, φ; ξ) coincides with the
one of G (θm, φ; ξ) , and, therefore, is zero. Assume bk (θ) = 0. Then, T (1, θm, φ; ξ)
is positive if πe (φ) is not "too large" compared to πne (φ).18
The second term is the diﬀerence between the discounted expected vacancy costs
in the two markets. It is obviously nil if there is a unique labor market and education
does not require time. If this term is suﬃciently small, and (πe (φ)− πne (φ)) not
too large, (−1)χ(θ) ∂P∂θm > 0, so that the direct eﬀect induces undereducation. On
the other hand, if (πe (φ)− πne (φ)) is positive and suﬃciently large, we may have
(−1)χ(θ) ∂P∂θm < 0, i.e., overeducation at θm. Bear in mind that, by definition of
WCO, the direct eﬀect does not depend in any way upon
¡
β + ηqk(φ)
¢
, because it
is computed at the given SSE vector φ∗. Hence, it can be diﬀerent from zero even
if the Hosios’ condition holds, for each k.
The second, indirect, component captures the welfare impact of the composition
eﬀect. By direct computation, rearranging terms, and using the fact that, at a SSE,
Φ (φ; ξ) = 0, we obtain that, at each θm,
(−1)χ(θm) ∂P
∂φk
∂φk
∂θm
=
"
γvkµ
¡
Θkα (φ; ξ)
¢ ¡
β + ηqk(φ)
¢
(1− β) (γ + πk (φ))
#
∂φk
∂θm
, each k,
where, for each k, ∂φ
k
∂θm
is computed applying the IFT to the map ΦΘ0e (φ; ξ) , the
relevant one from the planner’s viewpoint. For each k, this term is nil if and only if
either Hosios0 condition holds or ∂φ
k
∂θm
= 0. The Hosios0 condition comes back into
play because of changes of the equilibrium value of φ due to changes in θ, even if our
notion of eﬃciency is constructed to neutralize the canonical (i.e., given Θkα (φ; ξ) ,
each k) Hosios0 eﬀect. Assume (β + ηqk(φ)) > 0, each k, so that unemployment is
above its constrained optimum (according to the usual criterion) in both sectors.19
Then, a change in θm which decreases unemployment in each sector has a positive
eﬀect on surplus. By the IFT, and direct computation,
∂φ
∂θm
= −
∙
∂ΦΘ0e
∂φ
¸−1 ∙∂ΦΘ0e
∂θm
¸
= (−1)χ(θm) e−γT
⎡
⎢⎣
α (θm)
(fe(θm)−be(θm))−F e(φ;ξ)
µ(Θeα(φ;ξ))
³
−∂Φ
e
Θ0e
∂φe
´−1
[1− eγT − α (θm)] (f
ne(θm)−bne(θm))−Fne(φ;ξ)
µ(Θneα(φ;ξ))
³
−∂Φ
ne
Θ0e
∂φne
´−1
⎤
⎥⎦ .
18At each ρ such that T (ρ, θ, φ; ξ) = 0,
∂T
∂ρ
=
γ
?
α(θm)ρπ
e(φ)fe(θm)
γ+ρπe(φ) +
?
1− eγT − α (θm)
? πne(φ)ρfne(θm)
γ+ρπne(φ)
γ+ρπe(φ)
γ+ρπne(φ)
?
ρ (γ + ρπe (φ))
> 0
for πe (φ) suﬃciently close to (or smaller than) πne (φ) . Given that T (ρ = β, θ, φ; ξ) = 0, this
implies T (1, θ, φ; ξ) > 0.
19 In the one-sector model, the term in square brackets is the FOC of the planner’s optimization
problem. This is where the Hosios condition comes from.
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It is easy to check that
∂Φk
Θ0e
∂φk < 0, each k. Given that
¡
1− eγT − α (θm)
¢
< 0,
sign
⎡
⎣
∂φe
∂θm
∂φne
∂θm
⎤
⎦ = (−1)χ(θm) sign
"
[(fe (θm)− be (θm))− F e (φ; ξ)]
−[(fne (θm)− bne (θm))− Fne (φ; ξ)]
#
.
Hence, the sign of the indirect eﬀect depends, for each k, upon the signs of
(β + ηqk(φ)), and of
∂φ
∂θm
. The second determines the eﬀect on the rate of arrival
of matches (hence, on unemployment) of a marginal change in the set of agents
investing in education. The first determines the welfare eﬀect of an increase in the
value of φ.
Generally speaking, it is hard to discriminate between overeducation and un-
dereducation, also because, when there are several θm ∈ G−1φ (0) , the SSE may
be characterized by overeducation at some of them, by undereducation at some
others. The case where there is always a unique SSE threshold value θ defining
Θ0e(φ; ξ) is considered in the next section. The results of this section, however,
add to the previous literature for at least three reasons. First, they clarify the role
of the Hosios’ condition. The classical Hosios0 (1990) eﬀect is absent, because of our
definition of WCO. However, the same condition comes back into play because of
the composition eﬀect. The hold-up problem discussed in Acemoglu (1996) plays
a role in our set-up,20 too. However, it does not guarantees that equilibria are
characterized by undereducation, hence, that there is always a positive externality
related to investments in human capital.
5. TWO POLAR CASES: ABILITY AND EDUCATION AS COMPLEMENTS
AND SUBSTITUTES
To conclude, we consider the two polar cases where, at each interior SSE, there
is always a unique threshold θ ∈ G−1φ (0) . T is fixed throughout the section. We as-
sume (∂f
e
∂θ ,
∂fne
∂θ ,
∂α
∂θ ) >> 0 and, therefore, we can now interpret θ as some measure
of ability in all the relevant activities of the workers. We define as complementarity
the case where only the high θ types invest in education. As substitutability, the
one where just low θ agents invest. A priori, both cases are plausible, because what
matters is how the comparative advantages in the two jobs vary with θ.
Definition 5. An economy ξ ∈ Ξ, is characterized by complementarity (sub-
stitutability) between ability and education if and only if, at each interior SSE φ (ξ),
Θ0e (φ (ξ) ; ξ) =
£
θ (φ; ξ) , θh
¤
(Θ0e (φ (ξ) ; ξ) =
£
θc, θ (φ; ξ)
¤
).
For instance, the economies considered in Charlot and Decreuse (2005) are char-
acterized by complementarity.
We start providing some restrictions on the fundamentals which allow for a (par-
tial) characterization of complementarity vs. substitutability. Evidently, a suﬃcient
condition for uniquess of the threshold value θ is that the sign of ∂G∂θ is invariant at
each θ ∈ G−1φ (0) , for each possible SSE φ. Thus, we obtain complementarity if ∂G∂θ
is always positive, substitutability if it is always negative. Proposition 2 provides
a suﬃcient condition for the invariance of its sign at each SSE.
20 In his model, both human capital (in terms of eﬃciency units) and physical capital are elasti-
cally supplied. In a two-sector version of the same model, the welfare properties of the model are
sharply diﬀerent, because of self-selection in the two sectors and of the composition eﬀect (see,
Mendolicchio, Paolini, Pietra (2009)).
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First, we introduce a set of additional, simplifying, assumptions:
Assumption 7 (A7): bk (θ) = c (θ) = 0, each k and θ. Moreover, νe = νne and
qe (.) = qne (.) , 21 (∂f
e
∂θ ,
∂fne
∂θ ,
∂α
∂θ ) >> 0.
Also, let’s define as ηα (θ) , and ηfk (θ) the elasticities (with respect to θ) of the
functions α (θ) and fk (θ) , for each k.
Proposition 2. Under A1-A7, we obtain
a. complementarity: for each ξ ∈ Ξ such that ηα (θ) > 0 and
ηfe (θ)
ηfne(θ)
≥ 1, for
each θ;
b. substitutability: for each ξ ∈ Ξ such that ηfe (θ)ηfne(θ) < 1, and ηα (θ) is suﬃ-
ciently small for each θ.
All the proof of this section are in Appendix 7.5.
The discussion of WCO for the general case has already pointed out the role of
the sign of (β+ηqk(φ)) in aﬀecting the nature of ineﬃciency. For a general matching
function, this sign depends upon the SSE value of φ. However, in many applica-
tions, the analysis is restricted to constant elasticity functions (see Petrongolo and
Pissarides (2001)). Hence, it is meaningful to focus on this case.22
As above, we study the welfare properties of SSE assuming that r0 = 0, i.e.,
r = γ.
Proposition 3. Assume that complementarity holds, and that α (θ) and
ηfe (θ)
ηfne (θ)
are suﬃciently large for each θ. Then, each SSE is characterized by overeducation
if:
a. β ≥ |ηqk |;
b. β < |ηqk | and ηfe (θ) is suﬃciently small for each θ.
With complementarity, the direct eﬀect on welfare of an increase in the value
of the threshold θ is always positive, under the assumptions of Prop. 3. This
guarantees that ineﬃciency is due to overeducation if β ≥ |ηqk |, because the indirect
eﬀect is also positive: an increase in θ induces an increase in the equilibrium value
of πk(φ) in both markets. When β ≥ |ηqk |, this is welfare improving. On the
other hand, if β < |ηqk | the composition eﬀect has a negative impact on welfare. A
suﬃciently small value of ηfe (θ) guarantees that the direct eﬀect dominates.
Let’s now turn to the case of substitutability.
Proposition 4. Assume that substitutability holds, and that α (θ) is suﬃciently
large and
ηfe(θ)
ηfne (θ)
is not "too large", for each θ. Then each SSE is characterized by
undereducation if:
a. β ≥ |ηqk |;
b. β < |ηqk | and ηfe (θ) and ηfne (θ) are suﬃciently small, for each θ.
21With qe (.) = qne (.) , we mean that the matching functions are identical in the two sectors.
Evidently, as long as φe 6= φne, qe (φ) 6= qne (φ)
22According to Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001, p. 393), the range of the most plausible values
of ηqk (φ) is (−0.5,−0.3). The value of β has been estimated for several countries. Most of the
results suggest that it is fairly small (see Yashiv (2003, 2006), Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin
(2006) and other references quoted therein). However, Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006)
report values of βne around 0.1, but substantially larger values for βe. Flinn and Mabli (2008)
reports relatively high values of β. Hence, it is worthwhile to consider both β ≥ |ηqk | and β < |ηqk |
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We have studied eﬃciency with reference to the optimal solution of an ab-
stract optimization problem, where the planner selects the subset of agents in-
vesting in education. A natural question concerns the possible implementation of
welfare improvements obtained using standard policy instruments. In our set-up,
the simpler possible instrument are taxes and subsidies on the direct costs of ed-
ucation. We conclude showing that suﬃciently small taxes (or subsidies) on the
direct costs of education are welfare improving and can mitigate the adverse eﬀects
of over/undereducation. This requires us to evaluate the impact on welfare of the
change in the SSE variables induced by a change in the exogenous policy instru-
ment, hence, as a preliminary step, to determine the comparative statics properties
of SSE.
Given that the threshold θ is unique, we can describe interior SSE by the system
of eqs.
Ψ
¡
θ, φ; ξ
¢
≡
¡
Φe
¡
θ, φ; ξ
¢
,Φne
¡
θ, φ; ξ
¢
, G
¡
θ, φ; ξ
¢¢
= 0.
Let ∂θG
∂φk
, for each k, and ∂θG∂ξ define the derivatives of the map θ(φ;ξ) obtained,
at the SSE, considering only the map G(θ, φ; ξ) = 0. Let ∂θ∂ξ denote instead the
derivative of the actual equilibrium map θ(ξ). By the IFT,
h
∂φe
∂ξ ,
∂φne
∂ξ ,
∂θ
∂ξ
iT
=
−D(φ,θ)Ψ−1DξΨ, which can be written as
detD(φ,θ)Ψ (φ; ξ) =
∂G
∂θ
∙
∂Φne
∂φne
∂Φe
∂φe
+
∂Φne
∂φne
∂Φe
∂θ
∂θG
∂φe
+
∂Φe
∂φe
∂Φne
∂θ
∂θG
∂φne
¸
. (11)
We will further assume that, with complementarity
h
∂Φne
∂θ
∂θ
∂φne +
∂Φne
∂φne
i
< 0, i.e.,
that the total eﬀect of an increase in φk on expected profits in sector k (taking into
account the change in the composition of the pool of workers) is negative. Similarly,
with substitutability, we impose
h
∂Φe
∂θ
∂θ
∂φe +
∂Φe
∂φe
i
< 0. It is easy to check that this
(together with α (θ) large) implies that detD(φ,θ)Ψ(φ; ξ) is positive with comple-
mentarity, negative with substitutability. Also, one can check that this additional
restrictions are compatible with the other maintained assumptions.
We define the shocks to technologies, direct costs of education, probability of
graduation and matching functions in terms of a one-dimensional parameterization,
defined, for instance, by α (θ, a) = (1 + a)α (θ) . Shocks to vacancy costs are defined
in the obvious way. For the function c (θ), we focus on the case of θ-invariant,
additive shocks.23 The proofs of Prop. 5 and 6 follow by a strainghtforward (but
very tedious and, hence, omitted) computation.
Proposition 5. Under A1-A7, if
³
∂Φne
∂φne +
∂Φne
∂θ
∂θG
∂φne
´
< 0, and α (θ) is suﬃ-
ciently large, for each θ, in the case of complementarity, the following sign restric-
tions hold ⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
Âξ = fe fne c α ve vne qe qne
∂φe
∂ξ ? + + − − − ? +
∂φne
∂ξ − + + − + − − +
∂θ
∂ξ − + + − + − − +
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
23Given that c (θ) = 0, for each θ, multiplicative shocks are meaningless. We omit shocks to
(be, bne) because they do not have a clear eﬀect on the equilibrium variables.
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A suﬃcient condition for ∂φ
e
∂fe < 0 is
³
∂Φe
∂fe +
∂Φe
∂θ
∂θ
∂fe
´
< 0. A suﬃcient condition
for ∂φ
ne
∂qe < 0 is
³
∂Φe
∂qe +
∂Φe
∂θ
∂θG
∂qne
´
< 0.
The results above can be interpreted in terms of the Charlot and Decreuse’s
(2005) composition eﬀect. Changes in the exogenous parameters making, ceteris
paribus, the market for uneducated workers more attractive (i.e., dfne > 0, dc >
0, dα < 0, dvne < 0, dqne > 0) always increase both φe and φne. This is because
they attract (comparatively) higher ability individuals to this market, improving
the (conditional) expected product in both sectors. On the other hand, consider,
for instance, the eﬀect of a positive technological shock in sector e. It induces an
increase in the demand for education. Necessarily, this raises unemployment in
sector ne. Its eﬀect on unemployment in sector e is ambiguous. The direct eﬀect is
positive, while the composition eﬀect is negative. If this is suﬃciently large (so that³
∂Φe
∂fe +
∂Φe
∂θ
∂θG
∂fe
´
is negative), we can actually have an increase in the equilibrium
unemployment level. A similar argument holds for changes in qe (φ) .
The case of substitutability can be discussed in a similar way, once one takes
into account that, now, an increase in the investment in education improves the
average productivity in both sectors.
Proposition 6. Under A1-A7, if
³
∂Φe
∂φe +
∂Φe
∂θ
∂θG
∂φe
´
< 0, ∂α(θ)∂θ > 0, and α (θ)
is suﬃciently large, for each θ, in the case of substitutability, the following sign
restrictions hold
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
Âξ = fe fne c α ve vne qe qne
∂φe
∂ξ + − − ? − + + −
∂φne
∂ξ + ? − + − − + ?
∂θ
∂ξ + − − ? − + + −
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
A suﬃcient condition for ∂φ
ne
∂ξ < 0 is (
∂Φne
∂fne +
∂Φne
∂θ
∂θG
∂fne ) < 0.
Putting together the comparative statics results of the last two Proposition
and the welfare results of Prop. 3 and 4, we can identify the natural policy tool
to implement welfare improvements. Consider the case of complementarity with
overeducation. The introduction of a tax ∆c on the direct cost of education (whose
revenues are redistributed as lump-sum taxes) increases the SSE threshold value θ
and the pair (φe, φne), by Prop. 5. It is straightforward to show that, if overeduca-
tion holds, this policy is welfare improving. Similarly for the case of substitutability
and undereducation. To summarize,
Proposition 7. Under the assumptions of Prop. 2-6, a tax on the direct cost of
education (whose revenues are reallocated with lump-sum taxes) is welfare improving
in the case of complementarity, welfare reducing in the one of substitutability.
6. CONCLUSION
We have embedded the Roy’s model in a random matching environment. From
a generic viewpoint, the resulting economy is well-defined (i.e., there is a SSE, un-
der some restrictions on the - exogenous - length of the education process). Interior
SSE are generically ineﬃcient according to a very weak notion of constrained eﬃ-
ciency. Given the technique of proof adopted, these properties are robust to many
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possible extensions of the model. The more stylized, but still fairly general, ver-
sions of the model considered in the last section allow us to obtain reasonably sharp
comparative static properties of SSE, and a partial characterization of ineﬃciency
in terms of overeducation or undereducation. The nexus between comparative sta-
tics properties and the nature of ineﬃciency makes the model potentially testable
and allows (under the proper set of restrictions) to identify the policy instrument
suﬃcient to implement welfare improvements.
A key feature of the model is the role of the composition eﬀect. As pointed
out in Charlot and Decreuse (2005), investments in education allows agents to
self-select themselves into one of the labor markets. In economies with frictions,
generically, this has relevant consequences, which are ruled out by assumption in
economies where investments in education translate into an increase in the number
of eﬃciency units of the labor endowments.
An essential ingredient of our model is the assumption that matching is at
random. The extension of the analysis to economies with directed search is left for
future research.
7. APPENDICES
7.1. Stochastic structure
Assume that, at each t, a population is described by an interval Θ(t) endowed
with the Lebesgue measure, and that, for each i ∈ Θ(t), "death" follows a Poisson
process with arrival rate γ, and i.i.d. realizations. Then, it is often argued that
this implies ∂µ(Θ(t))∂t = −γµ (Θ (t)) . This statement is not correct, see Judd (1985),
and Feldman and Gilles (1985). More recent contributions on this issue include
Al-Najjar (2004), and Alòs-Ferrer (1999, 2002). Duﬃe and Sun (2007), Sun (2007),
Sun and Zhang (2009) provide a construction which guarantees the validity of a
modified form of LLN. This requires to replace the standard unit interval-Lebesgue
measure framework, and to modify the independence assumption.
If one wants to preserve as index set the interval [0, 1] endowed with the Lebesgue
measure, the i.i.d. assumption is the core of the problem. In many economic
applications, we just need to have, at the same time, individual uncertainty and
aggregate certainty. The easiest way to obtain this property in the usual set-up is to
drop the i.i.d. assumption. This approach has several advantages: First, it allows
us to maintain the same structure of the random matching literature. Second, it
avoids technical complexities. Third, it can be easily applied to Poisson processes.
Following Allen (1985, p. 96-97) and Feldman and Gilles (1985, p. 28-29), given
x ∈ [0, 1] , and a realization ω of a r.v. ∼ω uniformly distributed on [0, 1] , define the
interval
[ω ⊕ x] ≡ [max {0, ω − x} , ω] ∪ [1−min {0, ω − x} , 1] .
Termination and creation of job matches are described by Poisson processes
with arrival rates γ (exogenous), πk(φk) and qk(φk) (endogenous). The distinction
between endogenous and exogenous arrival rates is irrelevant, here, at least as long
as we consider steady states. We focus on the termination of job matches, and
start with discrete time. Consider a discrete process with time intervals of length
∆. Let bθ (t) be the set of agents of type θ alive at the beginning of the period. Its
measure is µ(bθ (t)) = 1. In each period, a r.v. eω ∈ [0, 1] realizes. If, at time interval
[t, t+∆,] eωt = ωt, death occurs for each i ∈ ωt ⊕∆γ. Hence, for each θ, and each
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period, a fraction ∆γ of agents dies, and, for each θi, the probability of death in
(if alive at the beginning of the period) is ∆γ. Consider now the limit for ∆ → 0.
By definition of derivative, for each θ ∈ Θ0, the rate of change of the population
due to "death" is −γ, so that A1-(b) holds. Moreover, by a standard argument, for
each θi, "death" occurs according to a Poisson process with arrival rate γ, so that
A1-(a) holds.
Consider now the r.v. "graduation". Pick θ ∈ Θ0e and, as above, consider a
discrete time process with intervals of length ∆. A set of measure γ∆ of agents
of type θ is born in the interval [t, t+∆]. To fix ideas, assume that, in that time
interval, the realization ω satisfies ω > γ∆, so that the interval of agents born in the
period is [ω − γ∆, ω] . Let [n, n] index the set of agents born in [t, t+∆] and still
alive after T time intervals. Consider now period [t+ T∆, t+ (T + 1)∆] and assume
that the value bω of the r.v. eω realizes. Define the interval bω[n − n] ⊕ α(θ)[n − n]
and assume that agents in this interval graduate. Evidently, each agents graduates
with probability α(θ) and a fraction α(θ) of the set of agents born at [t, t+∆] and
alive at [t+ T∆, t+ (T + 1)∆] graduates. Taking the limits for ∆ converging to 0,
we obtain A2.
7.2. Transversality theorem
Several of the proofs are applications of the transversality theorem (TT). In our
set-up, the parameter space Ξ is not finite dimensional. However, we will always
use local perturbations which are polynomial, i.e., finite dimensional. To go from
our results to the ones referred to Ξ is a purely technical, and straightforward,
matter. We will exploit the TT in several diﬀerent context. Therefore, we outline
here the general procedure. We use (arbitrarily small) perturbations of the vector
ν and of the functions (f, b, c). We start with a given function, for instance fk (θ),
and introduce a polynomial perturbation, setting
fk (θ; d) = fk (θ) +
VX
v=0
dkvθ
v,
where d ∈ D ⊂ RV , some small open neighborhood of 0. Using TT, we show that a
required property holds for all the vectors d ∈ D∗, some open, dense subset of D.
This is what we exactly mean saying that a property holds "generically in fk (θ)" or
"modulo a perturbation of fk (θ)". To use polynomial (hence, finite dimensional)
perturbations is convenient, and it does not imply any essential loss of generality
with respect to openness and density of the set of functions we restrict ourselves to.
We can also perturb in diﬀerent directions the same function at diﬀerent vectors in
its domain: Pick, for instance, θ1, θ2, with θ1 6= θ2. Choose two open neighborhoods
of radius ε, Vε (θ1) and Vε (θ2) , such that clV2ε (θ1) ∩ clV2ε (θ2) = ∅. Choose two
smooth "bump" functions (with nonnegative values) ψ1 (θ) and ψ2 (θ) , taking the
value 1 on the set Vε (θ1) (Vε (θ2)) and the value 0 at θ /∈ clV2ε (θ1) (clV2ε (θ2)).
Functions with these properties exist. Define the perturbed function fk (θ; d) =
fk (θ)+ψ1 (θ) d1+ψ2 (θ) d2. Evidently, on, say, Vε (θ1) ,
∂fk(θ;d)
∂d1
= 1 and ∂f
k(θ;d)
∂d1
= 0
at θ /∈ clV2ε (θ1) . In a similar way, and using polynomials, we can arbitrarily (and
independently) perturb the derivatives of any order of the functions.
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7.3. Existence and regularity of stationary equilibrium
7.3.1. Existence of interior SSE
We start with an outline of the proof. Consider the economy ξ. By A6, Tξ is the
largest value of T such that there is a SSE φ (T, ξ) with Θ0e (φ (T, ξ) ;T, ξ) = Θ0.
If, at Tξ, Φ (φ;T, ξ) were C1 and detDφΦ (φ;T, ξ) 6= 0, existence of interior SSE,
for each T > Tξ in some open neighborhood of Tξ, would follow immediately. By
IFT, there would be a map φ (T, ξ) such that Φ (φ (T, ξ) ;T, ξ) = 0, for T close to
Tξ. Existence of interior SSE would follow, because, by construction, at T > Tξ,
Θ0e (φ (T, ξ) ;T, ξ) 6= Θ, and, by continuity, Θ0e (φ (T, ξ) ;T, ξ) 6= ∅, for T close to
Tξ.
The diﬃculty is that, at Tξ, Φ (φ (T, ξ) ;T, ξ) is necessarily non diﬀerentiable,
because each θ∗ ∈ G−1φ (0) is either on the boundary of [θc, θh] or, worst, an interior
minimum of G(θ, φ (T, ξ) ;T, ξ), so that ∂G∂θ = 0. In both cases, Φ (φ (T, ξ) ;T, ξ)
fails to be diﬀerentiable. If G−1φ (0) is always a singleton, at Tξ, G
−1
φ (0) is a bound-
ary point and it is easy to sidestep this problem. The hard case is when, at Tξ,
G−1φ (0) ∈ (θc, θh) . For this case, we show that, for T suﬃciently close to Tξ, and
an appropriate perturbation of ξ, there is bξ arbitrarily close to ξ, such that there
is a SSE φ(T,bξ), Φ(φ(T,bξ);T,bξ) is C1 and detDφΦ (.) 6= 0. Existence of this SSE
follows by continuity of the maps G(.) and Φ(.) at
¡
φ
¡
T, ξξ
¢
, Tξ
¢
. This is a much
weaker condition than diﬀerentiability (plus ∂G∂θ 6= 0). Still, it is not necessarily
satisfied. We overcome this problem using TT.
We start proving that there are economies satisfying A6.
Lemma A1. Under A1-A5, let ve = vne, qe (φ) = qne (φ) , at each φe = φne,
and R
Θ0 α (ϑ) (f
e(ϑ)− be(ϑ)) dϑR
Θ0 α (ϑ) dϑ
>
R
Θ0 (1− α (ϑ)) (fne(ϑ)− bne(ϑ)) dϑR
Θ0 (1− α (ϑ)) dϑ
.
Then, for each ξ ∈ Ξ, there is Tξ such that there is a SSE φ (T, ξ) withΘ0e (φ (T, ξ) ;T, ξ) =
Θ0 if and only if T ∈ (0, Tξ]
Proof. Fix ξ ∈ Ξ. Consider the artificial economy with fixed set Θ0e = Θ0. The
two labor markets are then independent and, evidently, in each one there is a unique
SSE φk∗.We just need to show that, for T small enough, this is a SSE of the actual
economy, i.e., that G (θ, φ∗;T, ξ) ≥ 0, for each θ. By assumption, F e (φ∗;T, ξ) >
Fne (φ∗;T, ξ) , while ve = vne and qe (φ) = qne (φ) , at each φe = φne. Therefore,
φe∗ > φne∗, because ∂A
k
∂φk
> 0, for each k. Consider G (θ, φ∗;T, ξ) , given by eq.
(8). Under A4, if φe = φne, the term in square brackets is positive. By direct
computation, for each θ, ∂G∂φe > 0. By assumption, α (θ) > 0, for each θ. Hence,
the first term of G (θ, φ∗;T, ξ) is strictly positive for each θ. For T = 0, the second
term is nil. Therefore, for T small enough, G (θ, φ∗;T, ξ) ≥ 0 for each θ, and φ∗ is
a SSE. Evidently, for T large enough, G(θ, φ∗;T, ξ) < 0, for each θ. Hence, the set
of values of T ∈ R++ such that the given pair φ∗ is a SSE (and Θe(φ∗;T, ξ) = Θ)
is bounded above. Given that G (θ, φ∗;T, ξ) is continuous in T, there is
Tξ = max
©
T ∈ (0,∞) |φ∗ is a SSE at T and Θ0e (φ∗;T, ξ) = Θª ,
and φ∗ is a SSE with Θ0e (φ∗;T, ξ) = Θ if and only if T ≤ Tξ.
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Given an economy ξ ∈ Ξ, let φξ be its SSE for Θ0e = Θ0. Clearly, φξ is unique.
We split the proof of Thm. 1 into several steps. First, we show that, generically,
given ξ, at (φξ, Tξ), G
−1
(φξ,Tξ )
(0) is a discrete set. Next, we fix (φξ, Tξ) of a given
ξ, and show that there is an economy bξ (arbitrarily close to ξ) and some T?ξ > Tξ
such that φξ is an interior SSE of bξ, given T?ξ. The third step is to show that
rankDφΦ(φ;T?ξ,
bξ) = 2, at φ = φξ. Then, Thm. 1 follows by the IFT.
First, given ξ, we can (locally) restrict the analysis to φ ∈ zξ ⊂ R2++, where zξ
is a smooth, compact manifold without boundary.
Let φk = 12
n
φk|Ak(φk;T, ξ) = minθ
¡
fk (θ)− bk (θ)
¢o
, and
φ
k
= 2
n
φk|Ak(φk;T, ξ) = maxθ
¡
fk (θ)− bk (θ)
¢o
.
By A3, minθ
¡
fk (θ)− bk (θ)
¢
> 0, for each k. By compactness of [θc, θh] and
continuity of (f, b) , there is θ ∈ argmaxθ
¡
fk (θ)− bk (θ)
¢
. For each k, the function
Ak(φk;T, ξ) is continuous and strictly increasing. Moreover, givenA4, Ak(R++;T, ξ)
= R++. Hence, the pair (φk, φ
k
) exists and is unique, for each k. Evidently, if a
SSE φ∗ exists, it must be φ∗ ∈ int
Y
k
[φk, φ
k
]. Hence, we can take φ ∈ zξ ⊂ R2++,
where zξ has the properties stated above and contains
Y
k
[φk, φ
k
].
Fact 1.1. Under A1-A6, there is an open, dense subset Ξ0 ⊂ Ξ, such that,
for each ξ ∈ Ξ0, G−1(φ,T ) (0) is a discrete set at each (φ, T ).
Proof of Fact 1.1. Fix Θ0e = Θ0. Consider the map Ψ : [θc, θh]×R3++×Ξ→
R5, defined by
Ψ (θ, φ;T, ξ) =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
Φ (θ, φ;T, ξ)
G (θ, φ;T, ξ)
∂G(θ,φ;T,ξ)
∂θ
∂2G(θ,φ;T,ξ)
∂θ2
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ ,
and replace the function c(θ) with c(θ; d) = c (θ)+rdc0+rd
c
1θ+rd
c
2θ
2, where d ∈ D,
a suﬃciently small, open subset of R3, with 0 ∈ D. Assume that Ψ t 0. Then, by
TT , except for a null subset of Ξ, Ψξ t 0. Given that Ψξ : [θc, θh] × R3++ → R5,
this implies that Ψ−1ξ (0) = ∅, i.e., that, whenever Φξ (θ, φ;T ) = 0, at each θ ∈
G−1ξ (0) ,
∂nGξ(θ,φ;T )
∂θn 6= 0, for at least one n ∈ {1, 2} . Hence, θ ∈ G−1ξ (0) is neither
a degenerate local extremum, nor an inflexion point. To show that Ψ t 0, consider
D(v,d)Ψ (θ, φ;T, ξ) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ve vne rdc0 rd
c
1 rd
c
2
− r+βπ
e(φe)
(1−β)qe(φe) 0 0 0 0
0 − r+βπ
e(φe)
(1−β)qe(φe) 0 0 0
0 0
¡
1− erT
¢ ¡
1− erT
¢
θ
¡
1− erT
¢
θ2
0 0 0
¡
1− erT
¢
2
¡
1− erT
¢
θ
0 0 0 0 2
¡
1− erT
¢
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
which has full rank (the first row reports the variables we are diﬀerentiating with
respect to). Hence, by TT, except for a null subset of D, D1, Ψξ t 0. Restricting
the analysis to φ ∈ zξ, and T lying in some compact, smooth manifold in R+, we
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obtain that D\D1 is open and dense. Going from polynomial perturbations to the
set Ξ, we establish the result. ¥
Pick an economy ξ ∈ Ξ0, Tξ, and the associated SSE φξ. Evidently, for ε > 0
suﬃciently small,
a) if θc ∈ G−1c (0),
∂G(θ,φξ;Tξ,ξ)
∂θ |θ∈(θc,θc+ε) > 0;
b) if θh ∈ G−1(φξ,Tξ)(0),
∂G(θ,φξ;Tξ,ξ)
∂θ |θ∈(θh−ε,θh) < 0;
c) if θ0 ∈ G−1(φξ,Tξ)(0) ∩ (θc, θh) ,
∂G(θ,φξ;Tξ,ξ)
∂θ |θ∈(θ0−ε,θ0) < 0 and
∂G(θ,φξ;Tξ,ξ)
∂θ |θ∈(θ0,θ0+ε) > 0, i.e., θ0 is a local minimum.
Fact 1.2. Under A1-A6, there is a dense subset Ξ00 ⊂ Ξ0 such that, for each
ξ ∈ Ξ00, there is an interior SSE φ (T, ξ) , for some T. Moreover, at such a SSE,
∂G(θ,φ(T,ξ);T,ξ)
∂θ |θ=θm 6= 0, at each θm ∈ G−1(φξ,Tξ)(0), G (θc, φ (T, ξ) ;T, ξ) 6= 0, and
G (θh, φ (T, ξ) ;T, ξ) 6= 0.
Proof of Fact 1.2. Take ξ ∈ Ξ0. Fix φξ and pick any T > Tξ. G
¡
θ, φξ;T, ξ
¢
is clearly strictly decreasing in T. Therefore, Θ0e(φξ, T ; ξ) is a proper subset of Θ
0,
and, by continuity, nonempty, for each T suﬃciently close to Tξ, T > Tξ. Moreover,
for T > Tξ and suﬃciently close to Tξ, at (φξ, T, ξ),#G
−1
(φξ,T,ξ)
(0) ≤ 2#G−1(φξ,Tξ,ξ)(0),
so that G−1(φξ,T,ξ)(0) is a discrete set, and
∂G(θ,φξ;T,ξ)
∂θ 6= 0, for each θ ∈ G−1(φξ,Tξ,ξ)(0).
Also, we can pick T such that G
¡
θc, φξ;T, ξ
¢ 6= 0 and G ¡θh, φξ;T, ξ¢ 6= 0. Finally,
observe that (a− c) above imply that the correspondence Θe(φξ;T, ξ) is continuous
in T along sequences {Tn}∞n=1 , Tn ≥ Tξ, for each n (we loose this property when
at
¡
φξ, Tξ
¢
, G−1(φξ,Tξ,ξ)(0) contains an interval). Evidently the properties just estab-
lished hold for each ξ in some open, dense set Ξ00 ⊂ Ξ0: at each T > Tξ, T close
enough to Tξ, Θ0e(φξ;T, ξ) 6= Θ0 and Θ0e(φξ;T, ξ) 6= ∅. Evidently, the given φξ is
a SSE at Tξ, while it is not necessarily a SSE at T > Tξ.
We now perturb the parameter v so that, in the new economy bξ, φξ is a SSE at
some T > Tξ. Given that G(θ, φ;T, ξ) does not depend upon v, changes in this para-
meter have no eﬀect on the set Θ0e(φξ;T, ξ). It is easy to check that F
k
¡
φξ;T, ξ
¢
is
a continuous function of (T, ξ) , given that µ(Θkα(φξ;T, ξ)) is locally bounded away
from zero. Hence, for T → Tξ, Φ0
¡
φξ;T, ξ
¢
→ 0. Given that Ak
¡
φξ;T, ξ
¢ 6= 0 (and
is T−invariant), given any ε > 0, for T suﬃciently close to Tξ, there is v0 ∈ Bε(v)
such that Φ(φξ;T, (ξ
\, v0)) = 0. ¥
Proof of Theorem 1. Pick ξ ∈ Ξ00, and any T such that, at the associ-
ated interior SSE, ∂G(θ,φ(T,ξ);T,ξ)∂θ |θm 6= 0, at each θm ∈ G−1(φξ,T,ξ)(0) ∩ (θc, θh) ,
G (θc, φ (T, ξ) ;T, ξ) 6= 0 and G (θh, φ (T, ξ) ;T, ξ) 6= 0. By the IFT, there is a col-
lection of C1 functions, θm (φ;T, ξ) locally describing the set G
−1
(φξ,T,ξ)
(0), i.e., the
boundary points of the set Θe (φ;T, ξ) . Therefore, Φ(φ;T, ξ) is C1.
To conclude, all we need is to show that these properties imply that there is
also a dense subset Ξ
◦ ⊂ Ξ such that DφΦ(φ;T, ξ) has full rank at an interior SSE.
Pick any economy ξ00 in the dense set Ξ00 constructed in Fact 1.2. Let φ00 be the
associated interior SSE at T 00.
The strategy of the proof is the following: First, we show that (locally) arbitrary
changes in the pair (ve, vne) , call them dv = (dev, d
ne
v ) , can be compensated by
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appropriate changes in the production functions, call them df = (def (dv) , d
ne
f (dv)),
so that φ00 is still a SSE in the new economy at T 00. Next, we show that we can pick
a dv arbitrarily small and such that, in the new economy, ξ
◦
, arbitrarily close to
ξ00, detDφΦdv(φ;T
00, ξ
◦
) 6= 0 at φ00. By definition of density, this implies that there
is a dense subset Ξ
◦ ⊂ Ξ00 such that, for each ξ
◦
∈ Ξ◦ , there is an interior SSE at
some T (ξ
◦
) with detDφΦ(φ;T (ξ
◦
), ξ
◦
) 6= 0. By iterated application of IFT, there
is an open ball V (ξ
◦
) such that, for each ξ0 ∈ V (ξ
◦
), there is an open ball V (T (ξ
◦
))
such that, at each T ∈ V (T (ξ
◦
)), the economy ξ0 has an interior SSE with non-zero
determinant. This proves the theorem.
To conclude, we need to construct an economy ξ
◦
with the stated properties, for
each ξ ∈ Ξ00. Pick θ∗ such that G(θ∗, φξ;Tξ, ξ) > 0, and pick some open ball Vε(θ∗)
such that, for each θ ∈ clV2ε(θ∗), G(θ, φξ;Tξ, ξ) > 0, and a smooth bump function
ψ (θ) . By continuity, there is Vε(θ
∗) with the stated properties. For each k, define
fk (θ; d) = f (θ) +ψ (θ) dkf . By continuity, for ε suﬃciently small, this perturbation
has no eﬀect on the sets Θeα(φξ;Tξ, ξ) and Θ
neα(φξ;Tξ, ξ). On the other hand, its
eﬀect on the value of Φ(φξ;Tξ, ξ) is
∙
∆fΦe
∆fΦne
¸
=
⎡
⎢⎣
?
V2ε(θ
∗) α(θ)ψ(ϑ)dϑ
µ(Θeα(φξ;Tξ,ξ))
def?
V2ε(θ
∗)(1−α(θ))ψ(ϑ)dϑ
µ(Θneα(φξ;Tξ,ξ))
dnef
⎤
⎥⎦ .
Evidently, ∙
∆vΦe
∆vΦne
¸
=
"
−A
e(φe;Tξ,ξ)
ve d
e
v
−A
ne(φne;Tξ,ξ)
vne d
ne
v
#
.
Hence, to preserve the equilibrium, it must be
∙
def (d
e
v)
dnef (d
ne
v )
¸
=
⎡
⎢⎣
Ae(φe;Tξ,ξ)µ(Θeα(φξ;Tξ,ξ))
ve
?
V2ε(θ
∗) α(ϑ)ψ(ϑ)dϑ
dev
Ane(φne;Tξ,ξ)µ(Θneα(φξ;Tξ,ξ))
vne
?
V2ε(θ
∗)(1−α(ϑ))ψ(ϑ)dϑ
dnev
⎤
⎥⎦ .
Let’s define
Φ ((φ;T, ξ), df , dv) ≡
µ
F e(.)−Ae(.) +∆fΦedef +∆vΦedev
Fne(.)−Ane(.) +∆fΦnednef +∆vΦnednev
¶
≡ Φ(φ;T, ξ) +∆ (df , dv) .
By direct computation, Dφ∆ (df , dv) ≡
−
"
∆fΦ
e
µ(Θeα(.))
∂µ(Θeα(.))
∂φe d
e
f +
1
ve
∂Ae
∂φe d
e
v
∆fΦ
e
µ(Θeα(.))
∂µ(Θeα(.))
∂φne d
e
f
∆fΦ
ne
µ(Θneα(.))
∂µ(Θneα(.))
∂φe d
ne
f
∆fΦ
ne
µ(Θneα(.))
∂µ(Θneα(.))
∂φne d
ne
f +
1
vne
∂Ane
∂φne d
ne
v
#
and, substituting into it the vector df (dv) , Dφ∆ (df (dv), dv) ≡
−
⎡
⎣
³
Ae(.)
µ(Θeα(.))ve
∂µ(Θeα(.))
∂φe +
1
ve
∂Ae
∂φe
´
dev
Ae(.)
veµ(Θeα(.))
∂µ(Θeα(.))
∂φne d
e
v
Ane(.)
µ(Θneα(.))vne
∂µ(Θneα(.))
∂φe d
ne
v
³
Ane(.)
µ(Θneα(.))vne
∂µ(Θneα(.))
∂φne +
1
vne
∂Ane
∂φne
´
dnev
⎤
⎦ ,
where ∂A
k
∂φk
= 11−β
qk(φ) ∂π
k
∂φk
−(r+βπe(φe)) ∂q
k
∂φk
qk(φ)2 > 0, for each k. Given the results above,
without any loss of generality, ∂G∂θ |θ=θm 6= 0, at each θm ∈ G−1(φξ,T,ξ)(0). Then, using
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(2), and the function χ (θm) , such that χ (θm) = 1 if θm is the lower bound of an
interval [θm, θm+1] ⊂ Θ0e, χ (θm) = 2 otherwise,
∂µ (Θeα(.)))
∂φk
= e−γT
MX
m=1
α (θm) (−1)χ(θm)
∂θm
∂φk
,
and
∂µ (Θneα(.))
∂φk
= e−γT
MX
m=1
¡
1− eγT − α (θm)
¢
(−1)χ(θm) ∂θm
∂φk
.
Therefore,
∂µ (Θeα(.))
∂φe
∂µ (Θneα(.))
∂φne
=
∂µ (Θeα(.))
∂φne
∂µ (Θneα(.))
∂φe
.
Moreover, as shown in Prop. 1,
∂µ(Θkα(.))
∂φk
> 0, and
∂µ(Θkα(.))
∂φk0
< 0. Hence,
vevne
devdnev
detDφ∆ (.) =
∂Ae
∂φe
∂Ane
∂φne
+
∂Ae
∂φe
Ane (.)
µ (Θneα(.))
∂µ (Θneα(.))
∂φne
+
∂Ane
∂φne
∂µ (Θeα(.))
∂φe
Ae (.)
µ (Θeα(.))
> 0.
We conclude showing that, for an appropriate choice of dv, this implies that
detDφΦ ((φ; ξ), df , dv) 6= 0. Consider any matrix
B =
∙
a− a1dev b− b1dev
c− c1dnev e− e1dnev
¸
,
with detB = (ae− bc) + (bc1 − ae1) dnev + (cb1 − ea1) dev + (a1e1 − b1c1) devdnev . As-
sume that (ae−bc) = 0 (otherwise there is nothing to show) and that (a1e1 − b1c1) 6=
0. If (bc1 − ae1) = (cb1 − ea1) = 0, there is nothing else to show. Otherwise, pick
any dev such that [(bc1 − ae1) + (a1e1 − b1c1) dev] 6= 0 (this can be done because
(a1e1 − b1c1) 6= 0). Then, detB 6= 0 whenever
dnev 6=
− (cb1 − ea1) dev
(bc1 − ae1) + (a1e1 − b1c1) dev
.
Using the notation introduced above, detDφ∆ (df (dv), dv) 6= 0means (a1e1 − b1c1) 6=
0. Then, we just pick a pair (dev, d
ne
v ) satisfying the last two inequalities (so that
detDφΦ ((φ; ξ), df , dv) 6= 0) and suﬃciently small, so that the economy ξ
◦
so ob-
tained is suﬃciently close to the original economy ξ. ¥
7.3.2. Generic regularity of SSE
We start with a preliminary result.
Fact 2.1: Given T , there is an open, dense set of economies Ξ0 ⊂ Ξ, such that,
at each φ ∈ zξ ⊂ R2++, zξ compact, G−1φ (0) is either empty, or it contains a finite
number of isolated points.
Proof of Fact 2.1: It is similar to the one of Fact 1.1 above. Hence, we
just point out how the argument must be modified. Given that we have one less
variable (T is now fixed) and two less eqs. (the Proposition holds for all φ ∈ zξ),
27
we obtain a somewhat weaker results, because we cannot rule out inflexion points,
but only degenerate extrema. Define the system of equations
Ψ (θ, φ; ξ) ≡
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
G (θ, φ; ξ)
∂G
∂θ
∂2G
∂θ2
∂3G
∂θ3
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ = 0,
Ψ : [θc, θh]×zξ×V (ξ◦)→ R4, and c(θ; d) = c(θ)+
P3
j=0 rdjθ
j, for d = (d0, . . . , d3)
in some open set D ⊂ R4, such that 0 ∈ D, and c(θ; d) > 0, for each θ ∈ [θc, θh] .
It is easy to check that DdΨ (θ, φ; ξ) is a full rank matrix. Hence, Ψ t 0, and by
the TT, there is a an open, dense set D0 ⊂ D, of full Lebesgue measure, such that
Ψ−1ξ t 0, for each d ∈ D0. Given that Ψ−1ξ maps a subset of R3 into R4, Ψ−1ξ (0) = ∅.
Therefore, at each θ ∈ G−1d (0) , either ∂Gd∂θ 6= 0, or, if ∂Gd∂θ = 0, either ∂
2Gd
∂θ2 6= 0
or ∂
3Gd
∂θ3 6= 0 or both. It follows that G−1d (0) does not contain any degenerate
local extrema and, therefore, that it is a discrete set. Hence, by compactness,
G−1d (0)∩ [θc, θh] is a finite set. The same argument used above completes the proof
of the claim. ¥
Proof of Theorem 2. With an argument similar to the one of Thm. 1, we
can show that ΞT 6= ∅ and that it contains an open set Ξ◦T . Now T is fixed and,
therefore, omitted from the notation whenever possible.
Consider the intersection ΞT
◦∩Ξ0 (the open and dense set of economies whose
properties have been established in Fact 2.1 above). This is an open and dense (in
ΞT
◦) set. Given that, for each ξ ∈ Ξ0 and each φ in some compact manifold zξ,
G−1φ (0) contains a finite number of isolated points, this holds a fortiori at each SSE
of ξ, if any.
To show (i, ii) , assume that ΞregT is not dense in Ξ
◦
T ∩Ξ0, i.e., that there is an an
open set V (ξ◦) ⊂ Ξ◦T ∩ Ξ0\ΞregT . We start showing that there is a residual (hence,
dense) subset of V (ξ◦) ⊂ ΞregT , establishing a contradiction.
Fix N ∈ N. Pick any collection of N distinct elements of (θc, θh) with rational
coordinates, θ (N) = {θ1, ...θn, ..., θN} . Define
ε = min
½
min
n,n0
dist (θn, θn0) ,min
n
dist (θn, θh) ,min
n
(θn, θc)
¾
.
Evidently, ε > 0, and clV 2ε
5
(θn) ∩ clV 2ε
5
(θn0) = ∅, for each pair θn, θn0 , and θc,
θh /∈ clV 2ε
5
(θn) , for each n. Consider all the possible partitions of the collection
θ (N) into two (possibly empty) sets, call them Ps ∈ Þ. Evidently, the cardinality
of Þ is finite for each N. Pick a partition Ps ≡
©
P rs , P
0
s
ª
∈Þ. Without any loss of
generality assume that (modulo a relabelling) P rs = {θ1, ..., θNR} and θ1 < ... <
θNR. If #P rs is even, define:
1. Θ0e1 (P rs ) = [θc, θ1] ∪ [θ2, θ3] ∪ .... ∪ [θNR, θh] ,
2. Θ0e2 (P rs ) = [θ1, θ2] ∪ [θ3, θ4] ∪ .... ∪ [θNR−1, θNR] .
If odd, define:
3. Θ0e3 (P rs ) = [θc, θ1] ∪ [θ2, θ3] ∪ .... ∪ [θNR−1, θNR] ,
4. Θ0e4 (P rs ) = [θ1, θ2] ∪ [θ3, θ4] ∪ .... ∪ [θNR, θh] .
Use ζ, ζ = 1, ..., 4, to refer to the indexes above. Redefine the map Φe (φ; ξ) as
Φe (θ, φ;P rs , ζ, ξ) =
µ?
Θ0eζ(Prs )
α(θ)(fe(ϑ)−be(ϑ))dϑ
µ(Θ0eζ(P rs ))
−Ae (φe; ξ)
¶
, for each ζ. Redefine
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Φne (θ, φ;P rs , ζ, ξ) in a similar way. Set θ
a = [θ1, ..., θNR] and θ
b = [θNR+1, ..., θN ] .
Take a fixed ( bP rs ,bζ), and define the maps
ΦE(θa, φ; bP rs ,bζ, ξ) = ∙ Φ(θa, φ; bP rs ,bζ, ξ)G (θ, φ; ξ) at each θn ∈ P rs
¸
,
ΦEn
0
(θa, φ; bP rs ,bζ, ξ) =
"
ΦE(θa, φ; bP rs ,bζ, ξ)
∂G(θ,φ;ξ)
∂θ |θ=θn0 , at some θn0 ∈ P rs
#
, for n0 = 1, ...,NR,
Ψ(θ, φ; bP rs ,bζ, ξ) =
⎡
⎣
ΦE(θa, φ; bP rs ,bζ, ξ)
G (θ, φ; ξ) , at each θn ∈ P 0s
∂G(θ,φ;ξ)
∂θ |θ=θn , at each θn ∈ P 0s
⎤
⎦ ,
and
ΦEy(θ, φ; bP rs ,bζ, ξ) = ∙ ΦE(θa, φ; bP rs ,bζ, ξ)G (θy, φ; ξ)
¸
, for y = c, h.
Given that ΦE(θa, φ; bP rs ,bζ, ξ) depends explicitly on both φ and the vector θa, here
it is convenient to define a SSE as a pair (θa
0
, φ0). Notice that (θa
0
, φ0) is an interior
SSE if and only if ΦE(θa
0
, φ0; bP rs ,bζ, ξ) = 0 and the associated set Θ0e?ζ( bP rs ) coincides
a.e. with the actual set Θ0e
¡
φ0
¢
. An important diﬀerence with respect to the map
Φ (θ, φ; ξ) considered above is that Φ (θ, φ; ξ) may fail to be C1 (because ∂θn∂φ may
not exist at some θn ∈ G−1 (0)), while ΦE(θ, φ; bP rs ,bζ, ξ) is always C1. Also notice
that, for each given ζ,
ΦE : clV 2ε
5
(θ1)× ...× clV 2ε
5
(θNR)×zξ◦ × V (ξ◦)→ R2+NR,
ΦEn
0
: clV 2ε
5
(θ1)×...×clV 2ε
5
(θNR)×zξ◦×V (ξ◦)→ R3+NR, for each n0 = 1, ..., NR
Ψ : clV 2ε
5
(θ1)× ...× clV 2ε
5
(θN )×zξ◦ × V (ξ◦)→ R2+NR+2(N−NR)
and
ΦEy : clV 2ε
5
(θ1)× ...× clV 2ε
5
(θNR)×zξ◦ × V (ξ◦)→ R3+NR, for each y,
where zξ◦ can be taken to be a smooth, compact manifold (see proof of Thm. 1)
containing all the possible equilibrium values of φ (for ξ ∈ V (ξ◦)). Given ( bP rs ,bζ),
assume that all the maps defined above are transversal to 0. Then, for each map,
there is an open, dense subset of V (ξ◦) , call it, for instance, VΦE (ξ◦) , such that
ΦEξ t 0 for each ξ ∈ VΦE (ξ◦) . For the maps Ψξ (.) , ΦEn
0
ξ (.) , for n
0 = 1, ..., NR,
and ΦEyξ (.), for each y, this means that there is no solution to the system of eqs.,
because (given ξ) the dimension of the domain is strictly smaller than the dimension
of the range. For the map ΦEξ (.), Φ
E
ξ t 0 means that, for each ξ ∈ VΦE (ξ◦) , either
ΦE−1ξ (0) = ∅ orD(θa,φ)ΦEξ (.) has full rank at each (θ
a, φ) ∈ ΦE−1ξ (0) .We postpone
the proof that the maps defined above are actually transversal to 0. For the time
being, just assume so. Define as V({θ1,...θn,...,θN},P) (ξ
◦) the open, dense subset of
V (ξ◦) obtained as intersection of the (finite) collection of generic subsets of V (ξ◦)
so obtained.
Repeat the procedure for each ζ and for every Ps ∈Þ. Iterate the procedure for
each possible collection θ (N) = {θ1, ..., θN} with the properties discussed above.
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Finally, repeat it for each N ∈ N. We obtain a countable collection of open, dense
subsets of V (ξ◦) . Define as V 0 (ξ◦) the non-empty, residual (hence, dense) set so
obtained.
For each ξ ∈ V 0 (ξ◦) , at each SSE (θ, φ) such that the vector θ has rational
coordinates, properties (i − ii) of the Thm. are satisfied, by construction. Given
that any SSE (θ, φ) must satisfy (θ, φ) ∈ G−1ξ (0) , for each ξ ∈ V 0 (ξ◦) (iii) is also
satisfied by all SSE such that θ has rational coordinates.
We need to show that the construction can be extended to all the SSE (θ, φ). Pick
any ξ0 ∈ V 0 (ξ◦) and any interior SSE (θ0, φ0)
¡
θ0 = G−1 (0) ∩ (θc, θh) , φ0
¢
. Given
that ξ0 ∈ Ξ0, θ0 is a finite dimensional vector, with, say, N elements. Partition the
set G−1 (0) ∩ (θc, θh) into two vectors (θa
0
, θb
0
), such that ∂G(φ;ξ)∂θ |θ=θn = 0 if and
only if θn ∈ θb
0
. Let
ε0 = min
½
min
n,n0
dist
¡
θ0n, θ
0
n0
¢
,min
n
dist
¡
θ0n, θh
¢
,min
n
¡
θn, θ
0
c
¢¾
,
where, evidently, ε0 > 0.
Pick any sequence ofN elements with rational coordinates {θν ≡ (θv1, ..., θvN)}∞v=1
such that θν → θ0 (which exists, by definition of RN ). Let {εν}∞v=1 be the associ-
ated sequence of values of ε (constructed as above). Evidently, εν → ε0 > 0. Given
that any neighborhood V ε0
5
(θ
0
) contains a vector with rational coordinates, for v
suﬃciently large,
(θ
0
, φ0) ∈ clV 2εv
5
(θv1)× ...× clV 2εv
5
(θvN )×zξ◦ .
By assumption, and for some ( bP rs ,bζ), ΦE(θa0 , φ0; bP rs ,bζ, ξ0) = 0. By construction
and TT, given that ξ0 ∈ V 0 (ξ◦) , this implies that rankD(θa,φ)ΦEs (θa, φ; bP rs ,bζ, ξ0) =
(2 +NR) at
¡
θa0, φ0
¢
. Transversality also implies that Ψ(θ
0
, φ0; bP rs ,bζ, ξ) = 0 has
no solutions, so that θa
0
= θ
0
. Finally, given that ΦEy(θa
0
, φ0; bP rs ,bζ, ξ) = 0 has no
solution, G
¡
θy, φ
0; ξ
¢ 6= 0, for y = c, h. Hence, the Thm. holds at each interior
SE of such a ξ0, and, therefore, all the interior SSE of ξ0 are regular, i.e., ξ0 is a
regular economy. In turn, regularity of SSE implies that there is some small open
neighborhood of economies V
¡
ξ0
¢
such that, for each ξ ∈ V
¡
ξ0
¢
, regular SSE are
also described by the same collection of smooth functions. Continuity implies that,
for V
¡
ξ0
¢
suﬃciently small, each ξ ∈ V
¡
ξ0
¢
has only regular SSE. Otherwise, we
could construct a sequence of non regular equilibria converging to a regular SSE of
ξ0. This is impossible. This establishes the Thm. for an open, dense subset of Ξ
◦
T .
We still have to establish the key fact, i.e., that the maps defined above are
actually transversal to 0. We compute derivatives with respect to vacancy costs, v,
and to the function c (θ). Define
c(θ, dc) = c (θ) +
NX
n=1
ϕn (θn) (rd
c
0n + rd
c
1nθ) + ϕc (θc) rd
c
0c + ϕh (θh) rd
c
0h
where the smooth bump functions ϕn (θn) are positive only on the non-intersecting
neighborhoods V2ε (θn). Then, for each given ( bP rs ,bζ),
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D(v,rd)Φ
E(θa, φ; bP rs ,bζ, ξ) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
dv rdc01 · · · rdc0NR
DvΦ (.) 0 0 0
0
¡
1− erT
¢ · · · 0
0
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · ¡1− erT ¢
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
for each n0 = 1, ...,NR,
D(v,rd)Φ
En0(θa, φ; bP rs ,bζ, ξ) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
(dv, rdc01, ..., rd
c
0NR) rd
c
1n
D(v,d)ΦE · · ·
0
¡
1− erT
¢
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ,
D(v,rd)Ψ(θ, φ; bP rs ,bζ, ξ) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
(dv, rdc01, ..., rd
c
0NR) rd
c
0NR+1 · · · rdc0N rdc1NR+1 · · · rdc1N
D(v,rd)ΦE · · ·
... · · · · · · · · · · · ·
0
¡
1− erT
¢ ... 0 ¡1− erT ¢ θNR+1 ... ...
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
¡
1− erT
¢
0
...
¡
1− erT
¢
θN
...
...
... 0
¡
1− erT
¢ ... 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 0 0 0
...
¡
1− erT
¢
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
and
D(v,rd)Φ
Ey(θ, φ; bP rs ,bζ, ξ) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
(dv, rdc01, ..., rd
c
0NR) rd
c
0y
D(v,d)ΦE 0
0
¡
1− erT
¢
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ , for y = c, h.
Given that rankDvΦ(θ
a, φ; bP rs ,bζ, ξ) = 2, all the matrices above have full rank.
Hence, all the maps are transversal to 0. ¥
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7.4. Weak constrained ineﬃciency
The planner’s objective function is given by the stationary value of the expected
surplus. Hence, P 0(o, u,Θ0e; ξ) ≡Z ∞
0
e−γt
µZ
Θ0ne
((1− une) fne (ϑ) + unebne (ϑ)) dϑ
¶
dt (12)
+
Z ∞
T
e−γt
µZ
Θ0e
(1− α (θ)) ((1− une) fne (ϑ) + unebne (ϑ)) dϑ
¶
dt
+
Z ∞
T
e−γt
µZ
Θ0e
α (θ) ((1− ue) fe (ϑ) + uebe (ϑ)) dϑ
¶
dt
−
Z ∞
0
e−γt
µ
vneone
Z
Θ0ne
dϑ
¶
dt−
Z ∞
T
e−γt
µ
vneone
Z
Θ0e
(1− α (θ)) dϑ
¶
dt
−
Z ∞
T
e−γt
µ
veoe
Z
Θ0e
(1− α (θ)) dϑ
¶
dt−
Z T
0
e−γt
µZ
Θ0e
c (ϑ) dϑ
¶
dt.
The first three terms are the discounted surplus of the three diﬀerent groups of
people (uneducated, people who invested in education and failed, educated ones).
The next three terms are the associated vacancy costs. The last term gives the
cumulated direct costs of education.
Using the steady state conditions (7) and (8), ok = φkuk, and integrating over
time, we can rewrite P 0(o, u,Θ0e; ξ) as
P (φ,Θ0e; ξ) =
µ
e−γT
Z
Θ0e
T (1, ϑ, φ; ξ) dϑ+
R
Θ [π
ne (φ) fne (ϑ) + γbne (ϑ)] dϑ
γ + πne (φ)
¶
−e−γT
γveφe
R
Θ0e α (ϑ) dϑ
γ + πe (φ)
−
γvneφne
hR
Θ\Θ0e dϑ+ e
−γT R
Θ0e (1− α (ϑ)) dϑ
i
γ + πne (φ)
,
where T (1, ϑ, φ; ξ) is the value at ρ = 1 of the function
T (ρ, θ, φ; ξ) = α (θ)
ρπe (φ) fe (θ) + γbe (θ)
γ + ρπe (φ)
+
¡
1− eγT
¢
c (θ)
+
¡
1− eγT − α (θ)
¢ ρπne(φne)fne (θ) + γbne (θ)
γ + ρπne (φ)
.
Proof of Theorem 3. To avoid possible misunderstandings, we will denote
Ω0e,Ω0eα etc. the sets chosen by the planner. Define the maps F k
¡
Ωkα; ξ
¢
in the
obvious way.
Consider the set Ξ” of the economies such that every regular interior SSE allo-
cation, if it exists, is not WCO. We start showing that Ξ” is dense in Ξ. Assume, by
contradiction, that there is some open set V (ξ◦) ⊂ Ξ\Ξ”. Without loss of general-
ity (in view of Thm. 2), we can assume that each ξ ∈ V (ξ◦) is a regular economy
with SSE described by a collection of smooth functions (φ1 (ξ) , ..., φN (ξ)). Con-
sider the SSE described by φ1 (ξ) . Regularity also implies that, for each ξ ∈ V (ξ◦),
the correspondence G−1ξ (0) evaluated at
¡
φ1 (ξ) , ξ
¢
is described by a finite collec-
tion of smooth functions
¡
θ1
¡
φ1 (ξ) , ξ
¢
, ..., θM
¡
φ1 (ξ) , ξ
¢¢
. Moreover, at each SSE
G(θc, φ
1 (ξ) , ξ) 6= 0 and G(θh, φ1 (ξ) , ξ) 6= 0.
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To avoid unnecessary problems, it is convenient to restrict further the optimiza-
tion problem of the planner, by requiring that
1. the set Ω0e has the same structure of the set Θeα associated with the SSE,
2. the interior boundary points {θ1, ..., θM} lie in some small non-intersecting
open neighborhoods of the SSE boundary points.
For instance, if Θeα = [θc, θ
∗
1]∪ [θ∗M , θh]∪M−12
£
θ∗m, θ
∗
m+1
¤
, the (modified) plan-
ner’s optimization problem is
(φ, θ1, ..., θM ) ∈ argmax P (φ, θ1, ..., θM ) subject to ΦΩ0e (φ; ξ) = 0 (13)
θ∗m − ε < θm < θ∗m + ε, for each m.
Evidently, the planner’s problem (13) may have no solution (because the constraint
is not compact). However, if the SSE is WCO, the SSE vector (φ∗, θ∗1, ..., θ
∗
M ) is also
a solution to the stated optimization problem. Our approach is to show that the
necessary FOCs of (14) are typically violated at a SSE. This immediately implies
that the SSE is not a solution to (13) and, a fortiori, that it is not WCO.
The FOCs for an interior solution to the Lagrange problem (13),maxΛ (φ, θ1, ..., θm, δ) ,
are given by
i. ∂Λ
∂φk
= ∂P
∂φk
− δk ∂Φ
k
Ω0e
(φ;ξ)
∂φk
= 0, for each k,
ii. ∂Λ∂θm =
∂P
∂θm
−
P
k δ
k ∂Φ
k
Ω0e
(φ;ξ)
∂θm
= 0, for each m,
iii. ∂Λ
∂δk
= −ΦΩ0k (φ; ξ) = 0, for each k,
where (δe, δne) ∈ R2+ is the vector of Lagrange multipliers.
The complete system of equations defining a SSE is given by
a. Φ (φ; ξ) = 0,
b. G (θm, φ; ξ) = 0, each m.
We now show that, for a generic set of parameters ξ, if (φ, (θ1, ..., θM )) solves
(a− b), there is no strictly positive vector of Lagrange multipliers such that it also
solves (i− iii).
Define
Ψ (φ, (θ1, ..., θM ) , δ; ξ) ≡
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
∂Λ
∂φ
ΦΩ0e (φ; ξ)
∂Λ
∂θ |θ=θm , each m
G (θm, φ; ξ) , each m
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ,
where Ψ : RM+4++ × V (ξ◦)→ R2M+4,
Evidently, a WCO allocation must satisfy Ψ (φ, (θ1, ..., θM ) , δ; ξ◦) = 0. Indeed,
the first three blocks of (M + 4) equations are the FOCs a WCO allocation must
satisfy. The last M equations must be satisfied for (θ1, ..., θM ) to be the set of
(local) threshold values at the SSE. Assume that Ψ t 0. Then, for each ξ in some
dense subset of V (ξ◦) , Ψξ t 0, which implies that Ψ−1ξ (0) = ∅. Hence, our proof
reduces to show that Ψ t 0. Let GM (.) = [G (θ1, φ; ξ) , ..., G (θM , φ; ξ)] . By direct
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computation, D(δ,ξ)Ψ (φ, (θ1, ..., θM ) , δ; ξ) contains the following submatrix
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
dδe dδne dve dvne rdc dϕ
−∂Φ
e
Ω0e
∂φe 0 ∗ 0 0 0
0 −∂Φ
ne
Ω0e
∂φne 0 ∗ 0 0
0 0
∂Φe
Ω0e
∂ve 0 0 0
0 0 0
∂Φne
Ω0e
∂vne 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ D2(θ,dc)Λ D2(θ,dϕ)Λ
0 0 0 0 DdcGM DdϕGM
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
where "*" denotes (possibly) non-zero coeﬃcients. The meaning of (dδ, dv) is clear.
The associated columns are linearly independent because
∂Φk
Ω0e
∂φk
< 0 and
∂Φk
Ω0e
∂vk < 0,
for each k. The last two variables denote derivatives with respect to parameters
aﬀecting the functions (c(θ), fk(θ), bk (θ)). Pick a collection of M open balls of
radius ε centered on θm, Vε (θm) , such that clV2ε (θm) ∩ clV2ε (θm0) = ∅, for each
pair θm and θm0 . Also, pick a collection of smooth bump functions ψm (θ) , such
that ψm (θ) = 1 for θ ∈ Vε (θm) , ψm (θ) = 0 for θ /∈ clV2ε (θm) . For the column dc,
define c(θ; dc) = c (θ) +
P
m ψm (θ) rdcm . Given that
∂Λ
∂θm
= −
X
k
δk
∂ΦkΩ0e (φ; ξ)
∂θm
+ (−1)χ(θm) e−γT
×
∙
T (1, θm, φ; ξ)−
µ
α (θm) γveφ
e
γ + πe (φ)
+
¡
1− eγT − α (θm)
¢ γvneφne
γ + πne (φ)
¶¸
,
we have
D2(θ,dc)Λ = e
−γT ¡1− eγT ¢
⎡
⎢⎣
(−1)χ(θ1) · · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · (−1)χ(θM )
⎤
⎥⎦ .
Clearly, DdcGM =
¡
1− eγT
¢
[I] , where [I] is the M ×M identity matrix. The
structure of column dc described above follows immediately, because
R
Θ0e c (θ) dθ
does not directly aﬀect the first four rows of Ψθ1 (φ, δ; ξ).
Consider now the last column. Pick η suﬃciently small, such that (θm +
8η) <
³
θm +
θm+1−θm
2
´
, for each m such that θm is a lower bound of an interval
[θm, θm+1] ⊂ Θ0e, and (θm − 8η) <
³
θm − θm−θm−12
´
, for each upper bound θm.
When θm is a lower bound, define bθm ≡ (θm + 5η) . If it is an upper bound, bθm ≡
(θm − 5η) . Bear in mind that, by construction, for each m, G (θ, φ; ξ) > 0 for each
θ ∈ clV2η(bθm), and that the collection nclV2η (θ1) , ..., clV2η (θM ) , clV2η(bθ1), ..., clV2η(bθM )o
is composed by mutually disjoint sets. Given {θ1, ..., θM} and the associated col-
lection
nbθ1, ...,bθMo define, as above, the bump function ψm (θ) (bψm (θ)), such that
ψm (θ) = 1 for θ ∈ Vη (θm) , ψm (θ) = 0 for θ /∈ clV2η (θm) (that bψm (θ) = 1 for
θ ∈ Vη(bθm), bψm (θ) = 0 for θ /∈ clV2η(bθm)). Define the two perturbations
fe(θ; dϕ) = fe(θ) +
X
m
ψm (θ) dϕm −
X
m
bψm (θ) ζm
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and
be(θ; dϕ) = be(θ)−
X
m
ψm (θ) dϕm .
Fix ζm = 2
?
m
?
clV2η(θm)∩[θm,θm+1]
ψm(ϑ)dϕmdϑ
?
m
?
clV2η(?θm)
?ψm(ϑ)dϑ
if θm is the lower bound of an inter-
val in Ω0e, ζm = 2
?
m
?
clV2η(θm)∩[θm−1,θm]
ψm(ϑ)dϕmdϑ
?
m
?
clV2η(?θm)
?ψm(ϑ)dϑ
if it is an upper bound. By
construction, integrating over any interval [θm, θm+1] contained in Ω0e the eﬀects
cancel out. Therefore, these perturbations have no direct eﬀect on the functions
F k(Ωkα; ξ), each k, so that
∂Fk(Ωkα;ξ)
∂dϕ
= 0. Given that
∂Λ
∂φe
=
γe−γT
(γ + πe (φ))2
Z
Ω0e
α (ϑ)
µ
(fe (ϑ)− be (ϑ)) ∂π
e
∂φe
+
µ
φe
∂πe
∂φe
− γ − πe (φ)
¶
ve
¶
dϑ
−δe ∂Φ
e
Ω0e (φ; ξ)
∂φe
,
D2(φe,dϕ)Λ = 0, by construction. Evidently, D
2
(φne,dϕ)
Λ = 0, because ∂Λ∂φne does
not depend upon (fe, be, c) . Moreover, given that
∂Fk(Ωkα;ξ)
∂dϕ
=
∂Ak(φk;ξ)
∂dϕ
= 0,
∂Φe
Ω0e
∂dϕ
=
∂Φne
Ω0e
∂dϕ
= 0. Hence, the first four coeﬃcients of the last column are zero.
By direct computation,
D2(θ,dϕ)Λ = e
−γT π
e (φ)− γ
γ + πe (φ)
⎡
⎢⎣
(−1)χ(θ1)α (θ1) · · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · (−1)χ(θM )α (θM )
⎤
⎥⎦ ,
and
DdϕG
M |θ=θm =
βπe (φ)− γ
γ + βπe (φ)
⎡
⎢⎣
α (θ1) · · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · α (θM )
⎤
⎥⎦ .
Given the structure of D(δ,ξ)Ψ (φ, (θ1, ..., θM ) , δ; ξ) , to prove that Ψ t 0, it suﬃces
to show that the bottom right 2M × 2M matrix has full rank. Divide the first M
columns by
¡
1− eγT
¢
, column (M + 1) by α (θ1) , column (M + 2) by α (θ2) , and so
on. Finally, divide its first row by e−γT (−1)χ(θ1), the second row by e−γT (−1)χ(θ2)
and so on (up to row M). The matrix is now reduced to"
I π
e(φ)−γ
γ+πe(φ) [I]
I βπ
e(φ)−γ
γ+βπe(φ) [I]
#
.
Given that β < 1, this matrix has obviously full rank 2M. Hence, Ψ t 0 and,
therefore, by TT , there is a dense subset D1 ⊂ D such that Ψ−1ξ (0) = ∅. Given that
Ψξ (θ, φ, δ) : RM+4++ → R2M+4, for each economy in this dense set, Ψξ t 0 implies
that Ψξ (θ, φ, δ) = 0 has no solution. Regularity of the SSE immediately implies
that D1 is also open. Given that the number of equilibria of ξ ∈ V (ξ◦) is finite, we
can iterate the same procedure, obtaining a finite collection of open, dense subsets
of D, call them
©
D1, ...,DN
ª
. Their intersection is also an open, dense subset of
D. ¥
35
7.5. Two polar cases
Proof of Proposition 2. To establish complementarity, observe that, by direct
computation,
∂G
∂θ
=
∂α
∂θ
∙
πe (φ)βfe (θ)
r + βπe (φ)
− π
ne (φ)βfne (θ)
r + βπne (φ)
¸
+α (θ)
πe (φ)β
r + βπe (φ)
∂fe (θ)
∂θ
+
¡
1− erT − α (θ)
¢ πne (φ)β
r + βπne (φ)
∂fne (θ)
∂θ
.
Multiplying by θ and rearranging, we get
θ
∂G
∂θ
= ηα (θ)α (θ)
∙
πe (φ)βfe (θ)
r + βπe (φ)
− π
ne (φ)βfne (θ)
r + βπne (φ)
¸
+
ηfe (θ)
∙
α (θ)
πe (φ)βfe (θ)
r + βπe (φ)
+ (1− erT − α (θ))π
ne (φ)βfne (θ)
r + βπne (φ)
ηfne (θ)
ηfe (θ)
¸
.
Consider any θ ∈ G−1φ (0) . If ηα (θ) > 0 the first term is positive. By A3, ηfe (θ) > 0
and, when
ηfe (θ)
ηfne (θ)
= 1, the second term in square brackets is G (θ, φ) and it must
be nil. Hence, this term is nonnegative as long as
ηfe (θ)
ηfne (θ)
≥ 1 for each θ. This
establishes the first claim. b can be shown similarly. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3. Given an interior SSE φ, consider the direct eﬀect
∂P
∂θ |θ=θ ≡ ∂P∂θ , computed at the unique threshold θ ∈ G
−1
φ (0) . Using A7, the direct
eﬀect of a change in the threshold θ on total surplus is
eγT (−1)χ(θ) ∂P
∂θ
=
Ã
α(θ)πe(φ)fe(θ)
γ + πe(φ)
+
¡
1− eγT − α(θ)
¢
πne(φ)fne(θ)
γ + πne(φ)
!
−
Ã
α(θ)γvφ
e
γ + πe(φ)
+
¡
1− eγT − α(θ)
¢ γvφne
γ + πne(φ)
!
.
With complementarity, it is always πe(φ) > πne(φ). Hence, the first term in brack-
ets (T
¡
1, θ, φ; ξ
¢
, using the notation introduced above) is always negative, because
of two facts. First, T
¡
ρ, θ, φ; ξ
¢
= 0 if and only if (
γ+ρπe(φ))(γ+ρπne(φ))
ρ T
¡
ρ, θ, φ; ξ
¢
=
0. This last equation is linear in ρ, and hence it has a unique solution, β = ρ. At
ρ = β, if (πe (φ)− πne (φ)) > 0, ∂T(ρ,θ,φ;ξ)∂ρ < 0, so that T
¡
1, θ, φ; ξ
¢
< 0.24
Consider now the second term in brackets. Under the maintained assumptions,
φ
e
γ+πe(φ)
is an increasing function of φ
e
, unbounded above. Hence, for π
e(φ)
πne(φ)
(i.e.,
φ
e
φ
ne ) suﬃciently large, this term is positive so that (−1)χ(θ) ∂P
∂θ
< 0. A suﬃcient
condition to obtain an arbitrarily large ratio φ
e
φ
ne at the SSE is to have
ηfe (θ)
ηfne(θ)
suﬃciently large, for each θ.
Consider now the indirect eﬀect. Under the maintained assumptions, for α (θ)
suﬃciently large for each θ, (fne(θ)−Fne(θ)) > 0 for each θ, and ∂φ
k
∂θ
> 0, for each
24Comparing with footnote 18, here πe(φ) > πne(φ) always implies T (1, θ, φ; ξ) < 0 because
c (θ) = 0.
36
k. Therefore, if (β + ηqk) ≥ 0, each k,
(−1)χ(θ) ∂P
∂φk
∂φk
∂θ
= (−1)χ(θ)
X
k
γvµ(Θkα(φ; ξ))(β + ηqk)
(1− β) (γ + πk (φ))
∂φk
∂θ
< 0,
because χ(θ) = 1. Hence, weak constrained ineﬃciency of SSE is due to overedu-
cation.
If (β+ηqk) < 0, (−1)
χ(θ) ∂P
∂φk
∂φk
∂θ
> 0, but its value can be made arbitrarily small
(for each θ), if (fk(θ) − F k(θ)) is suﬃciently small, for each k and θ. A suﬃcient
condition to obtain this property is a suﬃciently small value of ηfk(θ), for each k.
Hence, for
ηfe (θ)
ηfne (θ)
suﬃciently large and ηfk(θ) suﬃciently small, for each k, b holds.
¥
Proof of Proposition 4. Assume that β ≥ |ηqk |. Then, the welfare impact of
the composition eﬀect is positive. For φ
e
φ
ne not "too large" the direct eﬀect is also
positive (which requires
ηfe (θ)
ηfne (θ)
not "too large" for each θ), so that undereducation
holds.
Assume that β < |ηqk |. Then, the welfare impact of the composition eﬀect is
negative. Suﬃciently small values of ηfe (θ) and ηfne (θ) guarantee that the absolute
value of the indirect eﬀect is small. We need a suﬃciently large (in absolute value)
positive direct eﬀect, for undereducation to hold. This obtains if
ηfe (θ)
ηfne(θ)
is not too
large. ¥
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